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JOINT LOGISTICS, FACT OR FICTION?

by

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Preface

This paper explores the ramifications of our new National Security Strategy on service capabilities to support deployed forces. It traces the changes in our National Security Strategy and supporting National Military Strategy in response to the radically transformed security environment of this decade, and the Armed Forces evolution to meet these new demands. Next it explores the effects of downsizing and budget constriction on capability, and the current status of joint doctrine in both logistics and Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW). It identifies lessons from recent operations and concludes with determining if service logistic capabilities match the demands of our National Security and National Military Strategies.

I selected this topic because I wanted to explore the topic of military logistics in MOOTW. Service reorganization (downsizing), the migration of Combat Service Support (CSS) capability to our Reserve and Guard force and expanded mission requirements are all dramatic changes. Have logistics doctrine and capability adjusted to this changed world?

Thanks are in order for the patience and guidance of my advisor in this effort, Colonel Ken Obermeyer.

Abstract

This paper examines the affects of an evolved National Security Strategy to meet the demands of a New World order on modern logisticians. It examines the expanded role of our military forces in the conduct of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) and the evolution of Joint doctrine to meet these new demands. The focus of this examination remains at the “strategic level” and the ability of the Services to meet the logistical demands of the modern theater battlefield.

The evolution of joint doctrine from Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) to MOOTW dramatically changes logistic requirements and the operational continuum of our forces. Does logistics doctrine adequately address this change? Current logistics doctrine, organization and techniques are products of the 20th century battlefield, tailored to meet the demands of a major regional contingency. Is change mandated to meet the differing demands of MOOTW?

The paper discusses the expanded role of logisticians in the conduct of MOOTW and assesses current doctrine, logistics lessons from United States deployments during the 1990s and the affects of post cold war military departmental contraction on service logistic capabilities. It presents recommendations based on this methodology for joint and service doctrinal adjustments and organizational priorities and capabilities that should be considered to meet the increased demands on our logistics systems during the next century.

Chapter 1

Introduction

If the army is confused and suspicious, neighboring rulers will cause trouble. This is what is meant by the saying: 'A confused army leads to another's victory.'

—Sun Tzu

The Military Departments and Armed Forces of the United States continue to struggle with change to retain their relevancy, potency, capabilities and quality. This directed evolution is being driven by a host of factors including: change in our National Security Strategy and its supporting National Military Strategy, doctrinal evolution to support our new strategic mandates, technological advances, force reductions, budget constriction, and a changed global operational continuum.

Change, by its nature, is hard for any organization but a critical necessity in our ever evolving world. By definition, without change you cannot have growth. History is replete with examples of great military forces that were slow or refused to adapt to an evolving threat and forces that paid for their leader's shortsightedness in their blood. The United States military has at best a mixed record in adaptation to an emerging threat. Early battles including: New York, Bull Run, Pearl Harbor, Kasserine, and Task Force Smith illustrate this point. Our citizen soldier ethic and national values predispose an inevitable reactive response to unexpected aggression. Without change our forces are condemned to fight the first battle with tactics and equipment from the last war.

This research explores the changes in our National Security Strategy (NSS) and supporting National Military Strategy (NMS) to meet the demands of a new global security environment after the end of the cold war. Next, it explores the ramifications of our evolution to “jointness” and the effects of downsizing and shrinking budgets on our military. Finally, it reviews the emergence of Joint Doctrine and lessons from major contingency operations as they relate to our military department’s ability to support contingency operations. It assesses current capability versus requirements and concludes with recommended changes in organization, doctrine and capability to support current strategy.

Any assessment of a strategic military capability needs to begin with the “Drivers” of that capability. Those factors that define the requirements and in turn impact the scope of the capability under study. The drivers for military logistics are our nation’s security strategy, the supporting military strategy, doctrine, service organization (capability) and theater mission requirements. Cumulatively these drivers define success and the operational continuum of our logistician.

The White House publishes the National Security Strategy of the United States annually, in accordance with the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, to define our nation’s grand strategy.¹ The National Military Strategy provides “the advise of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs (CJCS) in consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combatant Commanders on the strategic direction of the Armed Forces over the next three to five years”.² Military doctrine bridges the gap between strategic guidance and capability. It defines how our

forces should be employed. Joint doctrine establishes the “framework for our forces’ ability to fight as a joint team.”³

Joint Doctrine is authoritative. It provides guidance to the services in the execution of their Title 10 responsibilities and “fundamentally shapes the way we plan, think and train for military operations.”⁴ The methodology utilized in this research is designed to determine if service logisticians can meet the demands of our new National Security Strategy with the National Military Strategy, doctrine, force structure and technology of today’s armed services.

¹ William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, May 1977), i.

² John M. Shalikashvili, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America 1997* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, September 1997), 1.

³ The Joint Staff, *Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1 February 1995), introduction.

⁴ John M. Shalikashvili, *Joint Vision 2010* (Washington D.C.: GPO), 30.

Chapter 2

Strategy

The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is [rightly to understand] the kind of war on which they are embarking, neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.

—Carl Von Clausewitz

This chapter explores the evolution of our National Security Strategy and supporting Military Strategy from March 1990 through May 1997. During this period the White House published seven National Security Strategies (NSS) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs published two supporting National Military Strategies (NMS). Three of the NSSs were published by the Bush administration (1990, 1991, and 1993) and the Clinton Administration (1994, 1995, 1996, and 1997) published four.

During the last seven years the United States National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy have undergone a dramatic transformation, unprecedented since the last world war. This change was driven by a evolving world environment as our globe moved through the end of the cold war and into a new era of uncertainty characterized as “unimaginable only three years ago.”¹ During this period there are three dramatic shifts in the National Security Strategy (NSS). President Bush’s transition from a forty year policy of containment, President Clinton’s transition to “engagement and enlargement” and the 1997 transition to “American leadership and engagement”²

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

Our nation's *National Security Strategy of 1990* acknowledged the “breath-taking” changes taking place with the “systemic crisis engulfing the Communist world.”³ It also noted that our nation was “facing a strategic transformation born of the success of our post war policies.”⁴ It stopped short however, of declaring a formal end to the cold war, and represents our last national strategy founded on the principles of containment and deterrence. Elements of our 1990 defense agenda included: Deterrence, strong alliances, forward defense, and force projection for protracted conflicts.⁵ The Soviet Union retained a strategic priority because it was seen as the “only other military superpower” in spite of an acknowledged reduced threat.

President Bush's *National Security Strategy of 1991* formally announced the end of the cold war and proclaimed that a “return to the same superpower adversary we have faced for over 40 years is unlikely.”⁶ It represents a transitional strategy with national interests and objectives remaining essentially unchanged. The means to achieve these objectives changed from “strengthening our conventional capabilities”⁷ to “enhancing appropriate conventional capabilities”.⁸ This change recognized the directed military downsizing our forces were beginning to implement.

The NSS of 1991 begins the post cold war evolution. Within the four fundamental demands of our strategy, strategic deterrence (flexible Response) remained substantially unchanged. Strong alliances and solidarity with allies remained the first priority for our foreign policy. Forward defense in our 90 strategy changed to “exercise forward presence in key areas.” The demands of “respond effectively to crisis” and “retain national capability to reconstitute forces” were new additions in the 1991 strategy and

deemed prudent with force downsizing and a reduced presence in Europe. Our 1991 strategy began shifting focus from the Soviet threat to regional threats, calling for:

The need to support a smaller but still crucial forward presence and to deal with regional contingencies-including possibly a limited, conventional threat to Europe-will shape how we organize, equip, train, deploy and employ our active and reserve forces.⁹

It also called for prudent force reductions and recognized that with downsizing we would need to be judicious and prudent in force application when it noted:

We are a rich and powerful nation, and the elements of our power will remain formidable. But our wealth and our strength are not without limits. We must balance our commitments with our means and, above all, we must choose now which elements of our strength will best serve our needs in the future.¹⁰

Overall, the National Security Strategy of 1991 can be summed up as evolutionary. It remained defensive toward “ambiguous dangers and nascent threats of power vacuums.”¹¹ It even went so far as presenting an analogy between the strategic environment of the 1920s and 1990s and cautioned the nation to avoid the mistake of isolationism.

President Bush’s 1993 Security Strategy was characterized as one of “engagement and leadership.”¹² It completed our nation’s security strategy transformation from containment and shifted our defense strategy from a focus on a global peer competitor, to one of regional challenges, “from containment to a new regional defense strategy.”¹³ The fundamental elements of the strategy remained unchanged from the 1991 strategy of strategic deterrence, forward presence, crisis response and reconstitution. It did address a changed environment when it stated:

The end of the cold war has coincided with a virtual explosion of long-dominant ethnic and aggressive nationalistic tensions around the world, many of which have degenerated into international crisis.¹⁴

However, it failed to foresee an enlarged role for our military forces in the conduct of operations other than war. In fact, it cautioned against this development when it noted:

During the global struggle of the cold war, developments in even the remote areas could affect the United States' relative position in the world, and therefor often required a U.S. response. Today, the United States remains a nation with global interests, but we must reexamine whether and how particular challenges threaten our interests. A clear understanding of our interests and responsibilities along with the growing strength of our friends and allies will allow us to be more selective in determining whether U.S. forces must be committed.¹⁵

Overall, the 1993 Strategy professed a course of selective engagement with a greater reliance on coalitions and an increase in efforts “to improve regional and United Nations conflict prevention efforts, humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping capabilities.”¹⁶ It also directed a force reduction by “almost a quarter”, made possible by its transition to a new regional defense strategy and the demise of the Soviet global threat.¹⁷

The first National Security Strategy published by the Clinton administration, in July 1994, directed the second dramatic shift in our Strategy this decade. It transformed our strategic approach from a defensive to an offensive approach. Published seventeen months after the new administration took office, it represents a dramatic transformation from the Bush administration's strategy of containment, and the second dramatic change in our strategy this decade. This strategy provides the blueprint for the next four annual strategies. Its watchwords of “*Engagement and Enlargement*” are in response to what it characterizes as a “complex array of new and old security challenges.”¹⁸ This strategy was significantly more aggressive in design with stated central goals of:

- To credibly sustain our security with military forces that are ready to fight.
- To bolster America's economic revitalization.
- To promote democracy abroad.¹⁹

This new strategy took note of the reduced threat of a “war among great powers and the specter of nuclear annihilation.”²⁰ It also cautioned that troubling uncertainties and clear threats remained with wrenching economic and political transformations in Central and Eastern Europe, a repressive regime in China and the spread of weapons of mass destruction identified as “serious threats.”²¹ Violent extremists, a resurgence of militant nationalism and both ethnic and religious conflicts were also identified as threats to strategic stability.

This new strategy was “based on enlarging the community of market democracies while deterring and containing a range of threats to our nation, our allies and our interests.”²² It called for a “military capability appropriately sized and postured to meet the diverse needs of our strategy, including the ability, in concert with regional allies, to win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts.”²³ Additionally, it added the directive:

U.S. military forces and assets will also be called upon to perform a wide range of other important missions as well. Some of these can be accomplished by conventional forces fielded primarily for theater operations. Often, however, these missions call for specialized units and capabilities.”²⁴

This directive remained a common theme, expressed exactly as quoted from the 94 strategy in both the 95 and 96 strategies. In addition to the formally expanded role of the military noted above, the strategy also directs: “The United States must deploy robust and flexible military forces that can accomplish a variety of tasks: dealing with regional contingencies; providing a credible overseas presence; countering weapons of mass destruction; contributing to multilateral Peace Operations; [and] supporting counterterrorism efforts and *other National Security Objectives*.”²⁵

In effect, the first Clinton strategy greatly expanded the role of the military element in our nation's grand strategy. It diverges from the last Bush strategy that cautioned the prudent use of military forces (consistent with major force reductions), to a strategy where the military element of power would play unconventional roles. It formally identified multilateral peace operations as an important component of the new strategy.²⁶ It formally tasked the armed forces when it directed: “ In addition to preparing for major regional contingencies, we must prepare our forces for peace operations to support democracy or conflict resolution.”²⁷

The new strategy also redefined the conditions under which our nation would commit military forces. It broadened the conditions for commitment and defined a less restrictive test for commitment. This enlarged role for the military element in our nation's grand strategy is attributable with our armed forces greatly increased Operations Tempo (OPTEMPO). It directs that the United States government is:

Willing to act unilaterally when our direct national interests are most at stake; in alliance and partnership when our interests are shared by others; and multilaterally when our interests are more general and the problems are best addressed by the international community.²⁸

A common theme through all four Clinton strategies (to date) is the definition of when and how the administration would utilize military force. This definition remains relatively consistent through the four strategies. They present three categories of threat where “deployment of American military forces in the United States and abroad to support U.S. diplomacy” merit the use of armed forces: threats to vital interests, threats to *important but not vital U.S. interests, and humanitarian interests.*²⁹ Each strategy provides historical examples of each category. In the case of vital interests, all four strategies caution “we will do whatever it takes to defend these interests, including-when

necessary-using our military might unilaterally and decisively.”³⁰ With important but not vital interests the strategies call for use of military force if “they advance U.S. interests, are likely to accomplish objectives and the costs and risks of employment are commensurate with the interests at stake.”³¹ With regard to the third category-humanitarian interests, the 95, 96 and 97 strategies all acknowledge the military may typically not be the most effective tool but “may prove necessary when: normal relief agencies cannot meet the demands, need for relief is urgent, response requires unique military capabilities and when risk is minimal.”³²

Both the 94 and 97 strategies serve as bookends for the 95 and 96 strategies. The 95 and 96 strategies are essentially identical in substance. The 94 strategy is slightly less descriptive and more general in its approach. The 95, 96 and 97 strategies all address vital, important and humanitarian interests and collectively expand the military role in our grand strategy.

The 1997 National Security Strategy continues the expansion trend in the use of its military element of power in support of its delineated strategic priorities. It represents the third major transition in our NSS this decade. It continues the imperative of *Engagement* and adds *American Leadership* to its watchwords.³³ It defines six strategic priorities:

- Foster an undivided, democratic and peaceful Europe
- Forge a strong and stable Asia Pacific community.
- Continue America’s leadership as the world’s most important force for peace.
- Create more jobs and opportunities for Americans through a more open and competitive trading system that also benefits others around the world.

- Increase cooperation in confronting new security threats that defy borders and unilateral solutions.
- Strengthen the military and diplomatic tools necessary to meet these challenges.³⁴

The strategy continues the “enlargement” imperative from previous strategies when it states: “The trend toward democracy and free markets throughout the world advances American interests. The United States must support this trend by remaining actively engaged in the world.”³⁵ It departs from previous submissions when it groups threats to U.S. interests into “three, often intertwined, categories: regional or state centered threats, transnational threats and threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction.”³⁶ The 97 strategy defines transnational threats to include: terrorism, illegal drug trade, illicit arms trafficking, international organized crime, uncontrolled refugee migration and environmental damage. Weapons of Mass Destruction are characterized as “the greatest potential threat to global security.”³⁷

The 97 strategy directs three strategic imperatives: “To shape the international environment to prevent or deter threats; To respond across the full spectrum of potential crisis; Prepare today to meet the challenges of tomorrow’s uncertain future.”³⁸ When responding to a crisis, including important national interests, the 97 strategy is less restrictive in utilizing military forces. The previous three strategies called for a cost and risk analysis commensurate with the interests at stake and that all other means be tried and failed before commitment. The 97 strategy deletes this last condition.

The 97 strategy adds a formal discussion on the commitment of forces in smaller scale contingencies. It notes that these operations “encompass the full range of military operations short of major theater warfare.” It also anticipates that these operations will

“put a premium on the ability of the U.S. military to work closely and effectively with other U.S. Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, regional and international security organizations and coalition partners.”³⁹ It directs “U.S. forces will remain multi-mission capable and will be trained and managed with multiple missions in mind.”⁴⁰

Under the rubric of Major Regional Contingencies (MRC) the FY97 strategy directs a slightly greater capability be maintained. The 96 strategy directed: “in concert with regional allies, to defeat aggression in two *nearly simultaneous* (emphasis added) major regional conflicts.”⁴¹ The 97 strategy directs: “in concert with regional allies, must remain able to deter credibly and defeat large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in *overlapping time frames* (emphasis added).”⁴²

Between 1990 and 1997 there are three discernable shifts in our National Security Strategy. The first shift was from a strategy of containment to engagement completed during the Bush administration between 1990 and 1993. The second transformation occurred in 1994 and the Clinton administration strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. The last shift is in the 1997 strategy. Engagement remains in the form of shaping the international environment. Enlargement remains in support to democracy, open markets and human rights. The multi-mission focus directed for our military forces, use of force before all other means had been tried, and the requirement to fight in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames collectively represent a significantly more aggressive strategy for the military element of power.

New, less stringent, force commitment criteria also represent a significant change in policy. For decades, previous administrations had limited the commitment of our

military forces to situations threatening our “vital interests.” Current criteria include vital interests, important national interests and even humanitarian interests.⁴³

<u>Strategic Trends</u>	
<u>1990 Strategy</u>	<u>1997 Strategy</u>
Defensive	Offensive
Containment	Engagement, Enlargement, Leadership
Reactive	Proactive (Prepare Now)
Passive	Aggressive (Shaping)

TABLE 1

NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

“The National Military Strategy provides the advice of the Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) in consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combatant Commanders on the strategic direction of the Armed Forces over the next three to five years.”⁴⁴ It is submitted in accordance with the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986 that charges the CJCS with assisting the President and the Secretary of Defense in providing strategic direction for the armed forces. It is designed to implement the Defense agenda of the president’s *National Security Strategy* and policies directed by the Secretary of Defense.

Since 1990 there have been two National Military Strategies published. General Colin Powell published the *National Military Strategy of the United States* in January 1992 and General John M. Shalikashvili published the *National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 1997*.

General Powell’s January 1992 strategy represents a “shift from containing the spread of communism and deterring Soviet aggression to a more diverse, flexible strategy

which is regionally oriented and capable of responding decisively to the challenges of this decade.”⁴⁵ It echoes and implements President Bush’s National Security Strategy published in August 1991 and builds upon four key foundations outlined in the Security Strategy: Strategic Deterrence and Defense, Forward Presence, Crisis Response, and Reconstitution. To these four foundations it adds eight strategic principles:

- Readiness
- Collective Security
- Arms Control
- Maritime and Aerospace Superiority
- Strategic Agility
- Power Projection
- Technological Superiority
- Decisive Force

These “strategic Principles” represent imperatives that collectively meet the demands of the four foundations in the President’s Strategy.

The *National Military Strategy of January 1992* assumes the new “regional orientation” outlined in the president’s security strategy. It assumes this new regional orientation in response to “the decline of the Soviet threat (that) has fundamentally changed the concept of threat analysis as a basis for force structure planning.”⁴⁶ It outlines a new threat of “instability and being unprepared to handle a crisis or war that no one predicted or expected.”⁴⁷

Four major changes are outlined in the strategy. Three of these changes were directed in the *National Security Strategy*, one was necessary to effectively meet the

strategies new regional orientation. The changes directed by the National Security Strategy include: a changed threat, from global to regional; a new regional orientation to meet the threat; and a smaller force, the Base Force defined in the military strategy. Lastly, due to the new regional focus and efforts to strengthen unified and combatant command authority, it decentralized planning responsibility to the CINCs of Unified and Specified commands. It directed the CINCs to “plan for and be prepared to execute” four categories of operations:

- Employing strategic nuclear forces.
- Employ resources to build military and alliance readiness.
- Deploy and employ forces to meet regional military conflict.
- Deploy and employ reconstituted forces to counter global conflict.

The strategy also outlined a relatively restrictive force commitment criterion compared to today’s standard. It echoed criteria of the cold war when it stated:

Prior to committing U.S. forces to combat it must be determined that U.S. vital interests are at risk and that political, diplomatic, and economic measures have failed to correct the situation or have been ruled out for some other reason.⁴⁸

Overall, with the notable exception of the force commitment criteria, the military strategy of January 1992 represents a fundamental transformation in the services approach and methods. CINCs assumed an extensive regional responsibility for contingency planning, a new adaptive planning model was directed by the CJCS and the changed threat caused a shift in both the strategic focus and resourcing. Page eleven of the strategy acknowledges this shift when it directs our armed forces will deter and defend against global threats however, “plans and resources are primarily focused on deterring and fighting regional rather than global wars.”⁴⁹

The *National Military Strategy of 1992* spends nearly one third of the document dealing with the reduction of forces and restructuring methodology. It defines the base force as the structure required to meet the directed strategy, and “the much smaller force we intend to have in 1995.”⁵⁰ It offers a force that is smaller by 25 percent and uses the total force concept to respond across the spectrum of conflict. It relies on the timely commitment and availability of reserve forces to meet anticipated demands in a two MRC scenario. Table two is excerpted from the Military strategy (page 19) and presents a comparison of the FY 91 and “Base Force” structure.

<u>FORCE COMPOSITION</u>			
		<u>FY91</u>	<u>BASE FORCE</u>
	Bombers	B-52 + B-1	B-52H+B-1+B-2
STRATEGIC	Missiles	1000	550
	SSBNs	34	18
ARMY	Active	16 Divisions	12 Divisions
	Reserve	10 Divisions	6 Divisions
	Cadre		2 Divisions
NAVY	Ships	530 (15 CVBGs)	450 (12 CVBGs)
	Active	13 Air Wings	11 Air Wings
	Reserve	2 Air Wings	2 Air Wings
USMC	Active	3 MEFs	3 MEFs
	Reserve	1 Division/wing	1 Division/wing
AIR FORCE	Active	22 FWE	15 FWE
	Reserve	12 FWE	11 FWE

General Shalikashvili's *National Military Strategy of the United States of America 1997* implements President Clinton's *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* and Secretary Cohen's *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review*. It builds on the integrated strategic approach introduced in both of these documents. It defines a national military strategy of: "shape(ing) the international environment; respond(ing) to the full spectrum of crisis and prepare(ing) now for an uncertain future."⁵¹

The overarching military objective in the 1997 military strategy changed to support the relaxed force commitment criteria directed in the 1997 NSS.

1992 Objective

Fundamental objective of America's armed forces will remain constant; to deter aggression and, should deterrence fail, to defend the nation's vital interests against any potential foe.

1997 Objective

Our national military objectives are to promote peace and stability and, when necessary, to defeat adversaries that threaten the United States, our interests, or our allies.

New force commitment criteria echo those outlined in the National Security Strategy. It directs decisive and overwhelming force, unilaterally if necessary, to defend our vital interests. The commitment of forces is also *possible* to protect important interests, and even commitments when conditions exist that compel our nation to act because our values demand U.S. involvement in pursuit of humanitarian interests.⁵²

Overall, the 97 Military objective reflects the most proactive approach of the new strategies. Additionally, by adding other interests (important and humanitarian) and

those of our allies, to our national military objectives it significantly broadens the scope of military missions.

The imperative of Engagement is also discussed at length and linked to the goal of shaping the security environment in peacetime with the stated goal of “a world safer for our nation, our citizens, our interests, and our values.”⁵³ The imperative of Engagement serves as a foundation for our National Military Strategy and echoes the more aggressive approach mandated in our nation’s National Security Strategy since July of 1994.

Together with a relaxation in force commitment criteria, to include conditions that do not threaten vital interests, the imperative of Engagement and goal of shaping the international environment collectively account for the drastically increased Operations Tempo (OPTEMPO) of our armed forces. In May 1997, the U.S. Army reached its highest worldwide deployment level in its 222-year history. It had more than 33,300 soldiers and civilians executing more than 1,200 missions in 100 different countries.⁵⁴ Since 1990, the Army has been reduced to its smallest size since World War II. Its Active forces have drawn down by 36 percent, the Army Reserves are down by 33 percent and the National Guard by 20 percent. As of 1997, the ‘Total Army’ is 620,000 soldiers and civilians smaller, and has redeployed more than 250,000 personnel from forward bases in Europe. Since 1989 the Army has closed 89 installations in the United States and 664 overseas in concert with our nation’s new force projection strategy.⁵⁵

After describing its objectives and strategic concepts the NMS moves on to define force requirements (as outlined in the May 97 QDR) to meet the mandates of the 1997 National Security Strategy. This force is markedly smaller than the base force of

the 1992 strategy, in spite of an expanding military role in the execution of our National Security Strategy. The NMS of 1997 directs:

The United States requires forces of sufficient size, depth, flexibility, and combat power to defend the U.S. homeland; maintain effective overseas presence; conduct a wide range of concurrent engagement activities and smaller-scale contingencies, including peace operations; and conduct decisive campaigns against adversaries in two distant, overlapping major theater wars, all in the face of Weapons of Mass Destruction and other asymmetric threats.⁵⁶

To accomplish this Herculean task, our Armed Forces have been reduced by nearly 34 percent. Both force structure and methodology have been forced to evolve to accomplish more with less. The nature and scope of this evolution will be discussed in the next chapter.

¹ George Bush, *National Security Strategy of the United States August 1991* (Washington D.C.: GPO, August 1991), 1.

² William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, (Washington D.C.:GPO, May 1997),2.

³ George W. Bush, *National Security Strategy of the United States*, (Washington D.C.:GPO, March 1990),5.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid., 23.

⁶ George Bush, *National Security Strategy of the United States, August 1991* (Washington D.C.:GPO, August 1991),1.

⁷ NSS 90, 2.

⁸ NSS 91, 2.

⁹ Ibid., 25.

¹⁰ Ibid., 34.

¹¹ Ibid., 1.

¹² George Bush, *National Security Strategy of the United States, January 1993*, (Washington D.C.: GPO, January 1993), 3.

¹³ Ibid., 13.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid., 19.

¹⁷ Ibid., 13.

¹⁸ William J. Clinton, *National Security Strategy 1994*, July 1994 (Washington D. C.: GPO, July 1994), 1.

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- ¹⁹ Ibid., i.
- ²⁰ Ibid., 1.
- ²¹ Ibid.
- ²² Ibid., 2.
- ²³ Ibid., 5.
- ²⁴ This quote is found in three of the four Clinton strategies: NSS 94, pg. 8; NSS 95, pg. 10; NSS 96, pg. 15.
- ²⁵ NSS 94, 8.
- ²⁶ Ibid., 13.
- ²⁷ Ibid.
- ²⁸ Ibid., 5.
- ²⁹ NSS 94, 10; NSS 95, 12; NSS 96, 18; NSS 97, 9.
- ³⁰ NSS 94, 10; NSS 95, 12; NSS 96, 18; NSS 97, 9.
- ³¹ Ibid.
- ³² Ibid.
- ³³ William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy for A New Century* (Washington D.C.: GPO, May 1997), 2.
- ³⁴ Ibid., 2.
- ³⁵ Ibid.
- ³⁶ Ibid., 5-6.
- ³⁷ Ibid., 6.
- ³⁸ Ibid.
- ³⁹ Ibid., 12.
- ⁴⁰ Ibid.
- ⁴¹ NSS 96, 14.
- ⁴² NSS 97, 12.
- ⁴³ Ibid., 9.
- ⁴⁴ John M. Shalikashvili, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1997), 1. Also available on internet at <http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/nms>.
- ⁴⁵ Colin Powell, *National Military Strategy of the United States*, (Washington D.C.: GPO, January 1992), 1.
- ⁴⁶ Ibid., 3.
- ⁴⁷ Ibid., 4.
- ⁴⁸ Ibid., 15.
- ⁴⁹ Ibid., 11.
- ⁵⁰ Ibid., 18.
- ⁵¹ NMS 1997, 6.
- ⁵² Ibid.
- ⁵³ Ibid., 6.
- ⁵⁴ Togo D. West, "America's Army Meets the New Millennium", ARMY 1997-1998 Greenbook, October 1997, 13.
- ⁵⁵ Ibid., 15.
- ⁵⁶ NMS 97, 21.

Chapter 3

CHANGE

Only one thing is certain: the greatest danger lies in an unwillingness or an inability to change our security posture in time to meet the challenges of the next century.

—National Defense Panel Report, December 1997

EVOLUTION TO JOINTNESS

The first legislative step toward our current “Joint Orientation” was passage of the National Security Act of 1947. This Act formally established the Joint Chiefs of Staff and serves today as our organizational foundation modified by a series of legislative and executive changes. It created our National Military Establishment (NME) under a civilian Secretary who held coequal status with the cabinet level secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force. It also provided the basis for operation of our Armed Forces under unified control “for their integration into an efficient team of land, air and naval forces.”¹ Additionally, it established the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) as principal military advisers to the president and new Secretary of Defense.

The Key West agreement of March 1948 sought to refine the roles and missions of each service and confirmed the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s authority to serve as executive agents for the unified commands.² It sought to define the specific roles of each service as they had been broadly interpreted by each service and defined only by Executive Order.

In 1949, the National Security Act was formally amended for the first of six times. This first amendment converted our National Military Establishment (NME) to the Department of Defense (DOD) and changed the services to military departments subordinate to the DOD. It elevated the Secretary of Defense to head of an executive department over the department secretaries and assigned budgeting responsibilities to the Defense Secretary. In 1952, the Commandant of the Marine Corps was elevated to the JCS. In 1953, the JCS were removed from executive agents for Unified Commands with the military departments assuming this role.³

In 1958, the National Security Act was amended for the fourth time. This amendment removed the military departments as executive agents for the Unified Commands, placing them directly under the Secretary of Defense with “assistance” from the JCS in directing these commands. This amendment also formally defined service roles and missions and asserted the “direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense.”⁴ It also clarified the operational chain of command that runs from the President and Secretary of Defense to the Combatant Commands. A 1978 amendment provided the Commandant of the Marine Corps full voting membership in the JCS.

In 1986 the National Security Act was amended for the sixth time in 39 years. Public Law 99-433, best known as the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, was cited by Secretary of Defense William Perry as: “Perhaps the most important defense legislation since World War II.”⁵ The late Les Aspin, while serving as Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) characterized the act as:

One of the landmark laws of American history. It is probably the greatest sea change in the history of the American military since the Continental Congress created the Continental Army in 1775.⁶

The impetus for this historic legislation was a concern voiced in congress that each of the services exercised excessive power and influence over the body. Each of the service's pursuit of individual goals was viewed as divisive and counter to effective civilian control of the military. One of the House's leading specialists on reorganization assessed the problem as: "the overwhelming influence of the four services...is completely out of proportion to their legally assigned and limited formal responsibilities."⁷ A Senate investigation into the issue in 1985 found:

A heightening of civil-military disagreement, an isolation of OSD, a loss of information critical to effective decision making, and, most importantly, a political weakening of the Secretary of Defense and his OSD staff. The overall result of interservice logrolling has been a highly undesirable lessening of civilian control of the military.⁸

Goldwater-Nichols (GN) sought to bestow greater autonomy and increased the responsibilities for the CINCs of Unified commands. It also emphasized the civilian authority of the Secretary of Defense and clearly defined the chain of command from the President, through the Secretary of Defense to the commanders of the Combatant Commands. It also strengthened the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs role by designating the incumbent as the principal military adviser to the President, ranking member of the Armed Forces, and transferred the functions previously assigned to the corporate body of the Joint Chiefs (defined by 10 USC 153) to the Chairman. It also purposely and specifically omitted the Chairman and Service Chiefs from the chain of command and created the position of Vice Chairman who was subsequently vested by the National Defense Act of 1993 with full voting member status in the JCS. In all, the intent of this legislation was to foster and expand a joint approach in our Armed Forces.

Cumulatively, the NDA of 1947 and its subsequent amendments, culminating with the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, provide the legislative foundation for how our armed forces are organized to fight. In addition to this legislation, in 1989, the Department of Defense initiated the Defense Management Review in response to far reaching recommendations for reorganization in the DOD by the Packard Commission (1986). This study resulted in the 1991 Base force outlined in General Powell's, January 1992, *National Military Strategy* (see table 2), and presented as the “much smaller force we intend to have in 1995.”⁹

In addition to the services “transition to jointness,” the demand for a “peace dividend” after the American victory in the cold war has dictated a restructuring of the force. The next section will review the force downsizing since this cold war victory.

DOWNSIZING

As discussed in the preceding chapter, both the United States National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy have changed significantly to meet the changes in our global security environment. This evolution, the mandates for reorganization to meet the requirements of “jointness” in Goldwater-Nichols, and our nation’s demand for a peace dividend have collectively served as the impetus for our defense reorganization effort.

One “force structure study” after another has marked the decade of the 90’s. Two common denominators throughout are: that each subsequent study has called for a smaller military, justified by the reduced threat and loss of a peer competitor, and a increased emphasis on Jointness.

The current draw down of our armed forces began during the Bush administration. Ten years ago, the United States supported a standing military of 2.17 million active, 1.15 million reserve and 1.13 million civilian employees.¹⁰ As of the end of 1997, our forces stood at: 1.45 million active, 902 thousand reserve and 800 thousand civilian employees. Overall, the active military has been reduced by 34 percent, reserve strength is down 22 percent and civilian employee strength is down 32 percent from the post Vietnam cold war highs.¹¹

The 1989 Defense Management Review represents the beginning of the odyssey to today's smaller DOD and joint orientation. It was a result of far-reaching recommendations by the Packard Commission (1986) to reorganize the Department of Defense and was primarily targeted at improving acquisition strategies and oversight responsibilities. Additionally, the Defense Management Review marks the beginning of departmental efforts that are credited with "culminating in the 1991 Base Force."¹² This Base Force was presented by General Powell in his January 1992 *National Military Strategy* and subsequently recommended by the Bush administration in its January 1993 Annual Defense Report.¹³

General Powell's *National Military Strategy*, in addition to introducing the "Base Force" requirements, directed the decentralization of the Joint Planning process to the CINCs of the Unified and Specified commands.¹⁴ This action supported the strategies new regional approach and, in the spirit of Goldwater-Nichols, empowered the CINCs to drive the Joint Planning process.

At the beginning of the Clinton Administration, Defense Secretary Les Aspin completed the October 1993 Bottom Up Review (BUR). Like the "Base Force" analysis,

it was based on a two Major Regional Conflict (MRC) scenario. It determined a need for a 1.42 million active and 899,000 standing reserve force. The BUR called for: a reduction in Army active divisions to 10 (Base Force minus 2); Active Air Force Fighter Wing Equivalents (FWE) to 13 (BF-2); Air Force reserve FWEs to 7 (BF-5); USN active Air Wings to 10 (BF-1); USN reserve Air Wings to 1 (BF-1); ships to 346 (BF-104), and no change in the USMC force structure. The BUR was subsequently “criticized for underestimating the consequences of budget cuts”¹⁵ and its failure to consider the impacts of emerging missions.

The FY 94 Defense Authorization Act directed the creation of an independent commission to evaluate military structure and make recommendations to congress. The Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (CORM) delivered its final report, *Directions for Defense*, to the Department of Defense and Congress in May 1995.¹⁶ The commission offered a set of more than 100 specific recommendations with the defense department accepting two-thirds of the proposals for implementation. Major recommendations included:

- Completion of a Quadrennial Review modeled after the BUR.
- Improved means to finance contingency operations that protect modernization funding and do not mortgage the future.
- Revision of the Unified Command plan.
- Publication of Joint Vision by CJCS.
- Formation of Senior Advisory Group to oversee all implementation directives.
- Additional effort and improvement in Joint Doctrine development and training.
- Increases in Service support to all Unified commands.

- Modification of selected service responsibilities.
- Greater emphasis on the support roles of the National Guard and Reserves.
- Expanded contracting efforts for more nonessential functions.

The Commission side stepped the “who-gets-to-do-what” issues and focussed its efforts on building joint capabilities. The commission argued “that the terms of the roles and missions debate should be focussed on the needs of the commanders in chief (CINCs), on the capability of their forces to carry out joint operations, and on many of the Department’s support activities—not the capabilities of the individual services.”¹⁷

In May 1997, the Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, as recommended by the CORM in 1995, was presented to Congress.¹⁸ It presented a force structure that was also based on the capability to answer two Major Regional Contingencies, “while at the same time beginning to transform the force for the future.”¹⁹ Principal manpower adjustments presented in the QDR call for:

- Army: -25K Active, -45K Reserve, -33.7K Civilian
- Navy: -18K Active, -4.1K Reserve, -8.4K Civilian
- USAF: -26.9K Active, -700 Reserve, -18.3K Civilian
- USMC: -1.8K Active, -4-2k RSV, -400 Civilian

The QDR also calls for a restructuring of the Army reserve by reducing the strategic reserve and increasing depth in the Army’s support structure. Transfer of some Navy combat logistics force ships to the Military Sealift Command and the accelerated conversion of 12 National Guard Brigades from combat units to combat support and combat service support units are also recommended. Additionally, each service is to achieve “infrastructure efficiencies” to offset the recommended personnel reductions.²⁰

On 1 December 1997, the National Defense Panel (NDP) released its review of the QDR and submitted its report, *Transforming Defense, National Security in the 21st Century*, to congress.²¹ The report is extensive and many of its recommendations are already being classified as revolutionary.²² The report includes:

A condemnation of the 2 MRC (MTW) scenario, noting that it has become a “means of justifying current forces.”

The conclusion that this approach allocates significant resources based on a low probability scenario at the expense of increasing long-term risks.

A proposal to enlarge the role of the armed forces in “homeland defense” after 2010.

Identification of a critical need to refine the Interagency process, both international and domestic, to improve effectiveness, integration and capability.

Recommends creation of an Americas Command to address homeland defense issues.

Recommends creation of a Joint Forces Command to serve as a force provider for the CINCs, standardize Unified Commands, oversee Joint Training and experimentation, and to coordinate all battle lab efforts.

Recommends creation of a logistics command to merge support functions now divided among DOD Agencies.

Recommends revision of the department’s budgeting system.

Recommends additional Base Realignment And Closure (BRAC) rounds.

Recommends five to ten Billion dollars be allocated annually to transforming the force, even at the expense of OPTEMPO.²³

The National Defense Panel’s condemnation of the 2 MRC (MTW) scenario as a “capability” structure model will have significant repercussions. Until December 1997 this scenario has been the foundation of both our National Security Strategy and the supporting National Military Strategy. Minor revisions have occurred with the scenario evolving from a two MRC simultaneous affair-in greatly dispersed theaters; to a near

simultaneous, and in concert with our allies-after we drop everything else scenario.²⁴ In any case, this departure will be met with considerable resistance.

To date, a Desert Storm/Korea scenario has been bandied about to serve as a “near-term-worse case” scenario. The strategy called for the active forces to fight one MRC with the contingency Corps holding the second until reserves could be deployed. What the strategy failed to address was the “significant Combat Support and Combat Service Support shortfall” identified in this model, or the fact that historically once the contingency Corps is committed to a major theater of war, it stays committed.²⁵ Additionally, the remaining Active forces can not now meet any MRC requiring Desert Storm numbers of forces. A quick analysis indicates it will require seven of the 15 Army National Guard enhanced Brigades to achieve “tooth” parity with the 1991 commitments, and some 81,000 reservists to meet Combat Support and Combat Service Support parity.²⁶

My research agrees with the NDP conclusion that:

There is insufficient connectivity between strategy on the one hand, and force structure, operational concepts, and procurement decisions on the other. This is important since the QDR addresses an even greater array of challenges than we faced in the past with even fewer resources than were available four years ago.²⁷

Three main themes are repeatedly addressed throughout the National Defense Panel report. One of the primary themes is the need to “extend the spirit of ‘jointness’ beyond U.S. forces to the interagency process and inter-alliance venues.”²⁸ The need to better integrate and coordinate interagency efforts is addressed at length with significant recommendations beyond the scope of DOD recommended. These recommendations include:

- Establishment of a fully integrated national crisis center.

- Development of a Unified multimedia communication system.
- Creation of an interagency cadre of professionals.
- Expansion of members of the National Security Counsel to include the Secretary of the Treasury and Attorney General.
- Improved coordination between the Departments of State and Defense.²⁹

These recommendations are considered critical and of immediate necessity to improving the national response capabilities and effectiveness in execution of Operations Other than War scenarios.

The second major theme of the NDP report is its questioning of the administration's current force commitment criteria when it notes: "The current approach to addressing national security engages the Department of Defense and services too often and too frequently in situations that should have been resolved by non-military means."³⁰ It recommends strengthening the diplomatic, political, economic and other assistance efforts to prevent force commitments.³¹ I wholeheartedly agree with this assessment and recommendation.

A third theme professed in the report is the need to take action to protect modernization funding. The report notes that DOD has failed to meet its procurement goals for the last four years.³² It faults the QDR's assumption that \$60 Billion will be available to meet modernization requirements and takes note of the migration of these funds to offset cost overruns and increased OPTEMPO (OOTW). It notes procurement spending has been "crowded out" and together with the many new programs counting on cost savings achieved with projected acquisition savings, places the QDR force at risk for funding shortfalls.³³

Overall, the NDP report provides a plethora of recommendations that are beyond the scope of DOD and will require legislative or executive action to achieve. If enacted, this legislation would be comparable to the scope and impacts of Goldwater-Nichols. It will also go a long way toward transforming our Defense Department and national security structure to meet the demands of the next century. Given the political climate, expect DOD to implement what they can but those recommendations outside the scope of DOD will be tenuous at best.

1998 is the last year of the BUR-based five-year reduction plan. It is also the first year to implement decisions rooted in the QDR. Both the cuts recommended in the QDR, submitted in May 1997, and the NDP report of December 1997 have not been included in the DOD mandated reserve reductions to date. A 26 November 1997 news release did note additional reductions would be forthcoming. These reductions could total nearly 200,000 additional lost spaces, below those recommended in the Base Force and Bottom Up Review (see table three).

	<u>ACTIVE</u>	<u>RESERVE</u>	<u>CIVILIAN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
ARMY	25K	45K	33.7K	
NAVY	18K	4.1K	8.4K	
USAF	26.9 K	.7K	18.3K	
USMC	<u>1.8K</u>	<u>4.2K</u>	<u>.4K</u>	
DOD	71.7K	54K	60.8K	186,500

TABLE 3

On 6 March 1996, over fourteen months before the release of the QDR, General John M. Shalikashvili in his prepared statement to the House National Security Committee

noted: “The force structure we have designed for this purpose is as lean as the calculus of risk will afford. This is the force we must retain.” The underlying question now becomes, Are we hollow yet?

THE TOTAL FORCE

The Total Force Policy, which institutionalizes a heavy reliance on the reserve components to meet national defense requirements, was announced by the Secretary of Defense in 1969.³⁴ This policy has been viewed as both a means of integrating the reserve components into a single military force, and a way to maintain the “biggest bang” for the defense dollar.³⁵ Since the inception of this policy there has been a conscious effort by the DOD to preserve as much of its combat power as possible within the Active Components. This effort to maintain a higher percentage of combat power within the Active Component (AC) has been at the expense of both Combat Support and Combat Service Support capability within the AC.

The Total Force Policy has had the greatest impact on the U.S. Army. The Army maintains by far the largest reserve structure. In 1998, fully 64 percent of the total reserve structure will be in the Army National Guard and Army Reserve.³⁶ In 1998, only 46.2 percent of the Army’s total force manpower will be in its active component, compared to 67 percent in the Air Force and 81 percent in both the Navy and Marine Corps.³⁷

Post cold war downsizing, lessons from Desert Storm, budget reductions and the changed strategic environment have all had dramatic effects on the force structure and utilization of the reserve components. There has been a discernable shift from our historical approach of utilizing the Reserve Components (RCs) to constitute the strategic

reserve for global conflict scenarios, toward utilization of the RCs to augment the Active Component and provide services that no longer exist within the active force capabilities. This new approach has been driven by changes in our strategic approach from “containment” to “Engagement and Enlargement,” and the steady migration of Combat Service Support capability since the implementation of the Total Force Policy.

Reserve structure, by design, is cheaper to maintain than active forces. Both the DOD and Congressional Budget Office agree that National Guard units cost “25 to 33 percent of the cost of similar active components.”³⁸ This cost savings has played a vital role in sizing decisions and was acknowledged by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their 1991 *Joint Military Net Assessment* when they noted:

The availability and responsiveness of RC units count heavily in determining the most effective AC-RC mix, but cost savings and the appropriateness of tasking to the ‘part-time’ nature of the RC have been considered. RC forces will continue to be an integral part of the total force; however changes to the overall military force structure will effect RC as well as AC as we optimize US combat capability while remaining within fiscal constraints.³⁹

Two lessons from Desert Storm stand out as impacting current RC redesign efforts. The first lesson was that combat forces within the Army reserve structure are difficult to mobilize and deploy in time to be utilized in contingency operations. The second lesson was that with the current Active Force multifunctional alignment of logistics forces, there exists a severe shortage in wholesale and theater logistics capability within the Active Component and a 60,000 to 80,000 shortage of land based logistics capability in the Total Force. This critical shortage in logistics capability continues to be discussed seven years after it was discovered and two years after recommendations were made by the Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM) to stand down combat structure in the National Guard to build Combat Service Support capability.

The first lesson is in part a product of the difficulty mobilizing the 24th Infantry Division's "Round-Out" Brigade during Desert Shield. While specifics of this effort are beyond the scope of this study, its legacy has been a reduction in Army combat units within the RC. In 1990, 54 percent of Army combat units were within the Guard and Reserve structure. In 1997, 45 percent of this capability resides in the Army National Guard (ARNG) and zero in the Reserve. Since 1991 there has been a shift in mission focus between Army reserve elements. Combat elements have migrated to the ARNG and Combat Service Support elements to the Army reserve.⁴⁰ The impact of this lesson from Desert Storm on Combat Service Support capability is that this reduction in reserve combat units was accomplished during a period when the overall percentage of the Total Army force in the reserve components grew from 49.5 percent to 54 percent.⁴¹ This growth equates to an even larger percentage of the AC committed to Combat units and further shrinkage of Combat Service Support.

In 1997, 45 percent of Army Combat units, 54 percent of Combat Support units and 75 percent of Combat Service Support units reside in the RC.⁴² In 1990, these percentages were; 54 percent, 58 percent and 70 percent respectively.⁴³ During this seven-year span there has been a proportional increase of 9 percent in Combat formations in the AC and a proportional 5 percent decrease in Combat Service Support units. The tooth continues to grow in the AC while the tail in both the AC and the RC shrinks.

In 1995, the CORM viewed some of the National Guard combat structure as excessive and recommended its conversion to support forces. Within the ARNG Division Redesign initiative, the DOD currently plans to inactivate 12 ARNG combat brigades and use this force structure to form two divisions and six brigades of CS/CSS

units. This effort will reduce the Army's CS/CSS shortfall by 42,700 personnel if enacted.⁴⁴ It will also restore sorely needed CSS infrastructure into the ARNG, unless, as has been the historical case, these CSS forces are migrated to the Army Reserve for additional combat or aviation structure in the Army National Guard.

The second Desert Storm lesson, the lack of theater logistics and wholesale logistics capability, is a product of both the Total Force Policy and current active force design. The Total Force Policy fostered the migration of CS and CSS forces to the Army's reserve components to such an extent that we now have over 75 percent of this capability in the reserves. The remaining 25 percent, which supports 55 percent of the combat and 46 percent of the Combat Support units, is primarily multi-functionally organized and performs retail logistics functions.

The majority of Army Active Component logistics forces work in a direct support relationship with their customers. The RC provide the majority of all echelons above division and echelons above corps Combat Support and Combat Service Support.⁴⁵ The major obstacle to effective support with this organization is that once deployed, the retail logisticians have no wholesale organization to plug into for backup support or supply. This shortcoming has forced a greater reliance on contracting, the use of innovative concepts like the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) and the formation of direct links from the front directly to defense logistics Activities for resupply. Specific innovations will be discussed in the next chapter.

The migration of forces in support of the Total Force Policy appears to be having the desired impact of integrating the components into a single fighting force. Currently the USAR provides CS and CSS command and control for U.S. Central Command, the Corps

Support Command for I Corps, the Engineer Brigade for III Corps and the majority of Army force support package units.⁴⁶ The RC role in support to deployments in support of contingency operations has also expanded dramatically. In Fiscal Year (FY) 1996, the National Guard deployed soldiers for more than 1.5 million mandays.⁴⁷ In that same year, the Army Reserve offset more than 5.8 million mandays.⁴⁸ Force design is fostering a heavier reliance on reserve forces to accomplish the Army mission. Both components are virtually guaranteed to be present during any contingency operation requiring larger than a brigade sized force as the AC would be hard pressed to meet the backup and theater logistics missions.

The multi-functional organization and direct support customer relationship of AC logistics units places in question Army capabilities to effectively support joint forces. This multi-functional force design was adopted in the late 80's as a method of maximizing force structure and accommodating the effort to reduce the Army's tooth to tail ratio. USAR logistics units remain aligned functionally. The functional alignment of the RC lends itself to a building block approach and has greater flexibility in its support capability. Multifunctional units in the AC would be hard pressed to support any customers beyond their normal Direct Support relationship.

Recent contingency operations have highlighted logistic deficiencies in the AC structure. A quick review of contracting operations in each of these deployments details a severe shortage in motor transport, water purification, graves registration, terminal and port operations, supply and maintenance, and theater logistics command and control. In each operation innovation and persistence overcame structural deficiencies. While I applaud the innovative approach of our logisticians, none of the emerging techniques are

battle tested and many rely on a secure division, corps, and theater rear area. All rely heavily on existing transportation networks, communication networks, and the availability of support from host nations. Specific innovations and lessons learned from these contingency operations are discussed in the next chapter.

BUDGET REDUCTION

Like military end strength authorizations, the DOD budget has been decimated as our nation's leaders sought to achieve the illusive but well earned "Peace Dividend." Defense spending has declined in both real terms and as a percent of federal outlays for the last twelve years. It has declined both faster and further than the personnel account. The FY 1998 budget request to congress totaled \$250.7 Billion, 2.1 Billion below the level appropriated by congress in 1997.⁴⁹ This figure, in real terms, represents a forty percent reduction from funding since FY 1985 (in FY 1998 constant dollars). When compared to percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), there is a total decline from 6 percent to a 3 percent. This funding level represents the lowest funding level in the last 50 years.⁵⁰

From 1989 to FY 1997 the Department of Defense experienced a reduction of 37 percent in its constant dollar obligation authority. Since 1990 defense real dollars decreased by more than 29 percent while the non-defense sector actually increased by over 18 percent.⁵¹ In 1989, defense accounted for 304 billion dollars or 27 percent of national outlays; in 1996, defense budget authority totaled 262 billion or 16 percent of the national budget. This decrease took place at a time when total outlays increased from 1.14 trillion dollars to over 1.6 trillion.⁵²

In 1955 the Department budget accounted for over one half of the overall federal budget. Today it is approaching 15 percent as federal outlays continue to grow and the defense total shrinks. In 1998, the defense request is down to 250 billion with total government outlays exceeding 1.63 trillion.

During the 1990's the DOD made current unit readiness its top priority. This effort was consciously undertaken in spite of downsizing and dwindling budgets to avoid a "hollow force." To accomplish this feat, the service's Operations and Maintenance (O&M) accounts were maintained at levels 18 to 20 percent higher than during the 1980s.⁵³ The biggest bill payer for this capability protection has been modernization funding.

The FY 1997 combined funding total for procurement and Research and Development (RDT&E) marks the low point in the 12-year RDA cycle. Overall, procurement shrunk by more than 70 percent in real terms during the period, from 96.8 billion in 1985 to 38.9 billion in 1997.⁵⁴ In his 6 March 1996 remarks to congress, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff addressed this problem when he noted:

Procurement has continued to pay the bill for readiness and force structure over the past decade and now hovers at a post-World War II low of about \$40 Billion... With downsizing coming to an end, we must now increase our procurement accounts.⁵⁵

The FY 98 budget does not begin DOD's recapitalization of the force but does retain the goal of increasing procurement funding to 60 billion dollars by FY 2001. It is this goal that is attacked in the NDP report and faulted with placing the QDR force at risk.⁵⁶ In essence, conventional wisdom is shifting emphasis to modernization after almost a decade of neglect. This emphasis over the next several years may even be at the expense of readiness if DOD follows the NDP recommendations.

A second budget challenge for DOD during this decade has been the funding of contingency operations. Until the 1997 budget submission, Congress had not appropriated a single dollar to cover the Department's response to National Command Authority directed operations. In its 1997 defense bill Congress appropriated 1.3 Billion dollars to cover costs of on-going operations in Southwest Asia (Southern Watch and Provide Comfort), plus three months operations in Bosnia. The FY 98 budget included a request for 1.5 Billion dollars for on-going overseas contingency operations.⁵⁷ Unforecast operations, even today, continue to be funded from Service O&M and RPMA accounts.

In spite of the additional appropriations, the Department absorbed a 2.0 Billion dollar unbudgeted cost for contingency operations in FY 1997. Additional forces to Bosnia and the September 1996 return of forces to Iraq (Saudi) account for the costs. Total contingency costs for FY96 were \$3.2 Billion. These costs were absorbed by the O&M and procurement accounts.⁵⁸ In 1994, funding withdrawals to support contingency operations caused a "readiness crisis" in the Army as deployments late in the Fiscal Year forced units to adjust home station support to fund contingency requirements.⁵⁹ Without a mechanism to fund contingency operations in near real time, service O&M dollars and procurement dollars will remain at risk regardless of the priority they are given.

Overall, the Department of Defense budget has been reduced faster than both our force downsizing and base closures. The imbalance between force structure, funding, new and unfinanced missions, and infrastructure has forced the Department to explore alternatives to achieve savings to recapitalize important modernization programs. The Department continues to push hard for additional Base Realignment and Closures (BRAC). This effort is supported strongly by the QDR and Congressional National

Defense Panel reports but given little chance on the Hill. Our armed Forces have downsized over one-third in structure while the defense budget is down by over 40 percent. Out of these remaining dollars the Department is being forced to absorb large unfinanced requirements to support the National Security Strategy. To accomplish this "forward presence" the Department has taken a near decade long hiatus from modernization. Both the General Accounting Office (GAO) and National Defense Panel are now questioning the wisdom of this difficult decision.⁶⁰

¹ U.S. Congress, Public Law # 253, 80th Congress, Section 2, 26 July 1947.

² Alace C. Cole, Alfred Goldberg, Samuel A Tucker, and Rudolph A Winnaker, eds., *The Department of Defense: Documents on Establishment and Organization, 1944-1978* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office (GPO), pp.35-49.

³ Armed Forces Staff College, AFSC Pub1, (National Defense University, Norfolk, Va.: 1997), pp. 2-4 –2-11.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Mackubin T. Owens, *Goldwater-Nichols: A Ten-Year Retrospective*, Marine Corps Gazette, December 1996, pg. 48.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Archie D. Barrett, *Reappraising Defense Organization* (Washington: National Defense University, 1983), p.xix

⁸ U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Defense Organization: The Need for Change*, committee print, Senate report 99-86, 99th Congress, 1985, p. 620

⁹ NSS 1992, 18.

¹⁰ William S. Cohen, *Annual Report To Congress*, (Washington D.C.: GPO, April 1997), table C-1.

¹¹ Ibid., table 32, pg. 246.

¹² Army Link News, News Analysis, *QDR for dummies* (Army news service, May 16 1997), 1.

¹³ For a comparison of FY90, Base force, FY97 and FY 98 planned forces see appendix 1.

¹⁴ NSS 1992, 12.

¹⁵ QDR for Dummies, pp. 1-2.

¹⁶ Report available on internet at: <http://www.dtic.mil/execsec/adr96/chap6.html>

¹⁷ Commission on Roles and Missions report to Congress, *Annual Defense Review*, available on line at: http://www.dtic.mil/execsec/adr96/chapt_6.html

¹⁸ QDR report available on line at: <http://www.dtic.mil/qdr>

¹⁹ William S. Cohen, *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review* (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1997) 1.

²⁰ QDR, section V, 1-2.

²¹ Report is available on the internet at: <http://www.dtic.mil/ndp>.

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- ²² *Defense Panel's Perfect Force: Light, Quick, Agile*, Army Times, December 15 1997, pg. 4.
- ²³ National Defense Panel, *Transforming Defense, National Security in the 21st Century*, available on line at: <http://www.dtic.mil/ndp>.
- ²⁴ William S. Cohen, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress*, (Washington D. C.: GPO, April 1997), 16.
- ²⁵ QDR, Section v, 6.
- ²⁶ William G. Pagonis, *Moving Mountains, Lessons in Leadership and Logistics from the Gulf War*, (Boston, MA.: Harvard Business School Press, 1992), 11.
- ²⁷ NDP, Executive Summary, 2.
- ²⁸ NDP, 32.
- ²⁹ NDP, pp. 66-67.
- ³⁰ NDP, 32.
- ³¹ Ibid.
- ³² Ibid., 58.
- ³³ Ibid., 59.
- ³⁴ Sol Gordon, Sr. Ed., *National Guard Almanac 1990*, sixteenth Edition (Uniformed Services Almanac, Inc.: 1990), 129.
- ³⁵ Ibid., 129-131.
- ³⁶ Annual Report to Congress, April 1997, table C-1.
- ³⁷ Ibid.
- ³⁸ William A Navas, Jr., *Army National Guard: Capable, Cost Effective' and Vital Force*, Army Green Book 1997-1998, (AUSA, Arlington, Va.: October 1997), 86.
- ³⁹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1991 Joint Military Net Assessment, (Washington D.C.: GPO, March 1991), pg. 11-10.
- ⁴⁰ AUSA, Institute of Land Warfare, *Army Budget FY 1997*, (Arlington, Va.: May 1996), 58.
- ⁴¹ Annual Report to Congress, April 1997, table C-1.
- ⁴² HQDA, Office of Public Affairs, Policy and Liaison, USAR Briefing.
- ⁴³ USAR, *FY 1990 Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board*, (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1990), table 5, pg. 25.
- ⁴⁴ Annual Report to Congress, April 1997, 227.
- ⁴⁵ Max Baratz, *A Reorganized Army Reserve: Relevant and Ready*, Army Green Book 1997-98, (AUSA, Arlington, Va.: October 1997), 94.
- ⁴⁶ Ibid., 96.
- ⁴⁷ William A Navas, Jr., *Army National Guard: Capable, Cost Effective' and Vital Force*, Army Green Book 1997-1998, (AUSA, Arlington, Va.: October 1997), 90.
- ⁴⁸ Max Baratz, 94.
- ⁴⁹ Annual Report to Congress, April 1997, 243.
- ⁵⁰ Ibid., 244.
- ⁵¹ AUSA, Institute of Land Warfare, *Army Budget FY 1997*, (Arlington, VA.: May 1996), 3.
- ⁵² Department of the Army, *The Army Budget Greenbook*, (Washington D.C.: Army Budget Office, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller, 1995), 2.
- ⁵³ Army Budget FY97, 14.

⁵⁴ Ibid., table 10.

⁵⁵ Prepared statement of General John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the House on National Security Committee, March 6, 1996, Defense Issues, Vol. 11, #38, 5.

⁵⁶ NDP, 59.

⁵⁷ Annual Report to Congress, April 1997, 248.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 29.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ NDP, 58.

Chapter 4

DOCTRINE AND EXECUTION

Those who expect to reap the blessings of freedom must undergo the fatigue of supporting it.

—Thomas Paine 1777

This chapter discusses the evolution of Joint Doctrine and selected Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) during the last decade. It traces the evolution of Joint doctrine since Goldwater-Nichols and identifies logistical lessons and imperatives that emerge as our Services grappled with new doctrine, expanded mission requirements, cold war organization, steeply falling budgets and slashed personnel accounts. It does not assess the adequacy of doctrinal imperatives and instead focuses on the process and lessons. I have selected this approach because current doctrine is in a rapid phase of evolution to meet the changed demands of the operating environment, force structure, technology and mission evolution. I agree with the Commission on Roles and Missions when it declared in its 1995 report, "In many cases, it [joint doctrine] represents a compendium of competing and sometimes incompatible concepts (often developed by one 'lead service')."¹

DOCTRINE

The “evolution to jointness” has spawned an explosion in the Joint Doctrine arena. What had been a single set of volumes that would fit on a bookshelf ten years ago, will now fill a small library. The Armed Forces Staff College Publication 1, *The Joint Staff Officer’s Guide 1986*, lists a total of twelve Joint Publications (prior to Goldwater-Nichols). At last count (November 1997) there are 108 Joint Publications either approved or under development.

Prior to 1986 there was no single individual or agency within DOD that had responsibility for joint doctrine. There were also no established procedures for Combatant Commands to participate in joint doctrine development or staffing. Additionally, there was no single agency that evaluated current doctrine to insure existing joint doctrine, service doctrine, multi-service doctrine and combined doctrine were consistent.²

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 addressed this problem when it made the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff singularly responsible for “developing doctrine for joint employment of the armed forces.”³ Additionally, JCS Publication 2, dated December 1986, directed: “Each service will ensure that its doctrine and procedures are consistent with joint doctrine established by the CJCS.” It also directed a change in the doctrine development process to include coordination with the services, Unified and Specified commands.⁴

In early 1987, the CJCS reorganized the Joint Staff and assigned responsibility for: joint planning, training, exercises, evaluation, doctrine, education, and interoperability to the new Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate, J7. Concurrently, a new Joint

Doctrine Center was formed under the control of the J-7, as a joint activity. Its mission was to oversee doctrine development in its early stages, identify key doctrinal issues and to validate doctrine after publication. In February 1988, the Joint Doctrine Master Plan was approved and published as Joint Publication 1-01 and the Joint Staff and Services began their transition to today's library.

As noted earlier, today's library consists of 108 publications. Twenty of these are directed at Joint Logistics and sixty-six discuss Joint Operations. Of the twenty Joint Logistics Publications, eight address logistics doctrine:

- JP 4-0 Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations
- JP 4-01 Defense Transportation System
- JP 4-02 Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations
- JP 4-03 Joint Bulk Petroleum Doctrine
- JP 4-04 Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support
- JP 4-05 Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning
- JP 4-07 Joint Doctrine for Common User Logistics
- JP 4-08 Joint Doctrine for Multi-National Logistics

Six of these eight publications are less than three years old and the last two remain in development. The remaining twelve logistics publications define Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) that support the joint doctrine. Eight address transportation, two discuss health service, one mobilization, and one defines mortuary affairs requirements. Three of the TTPs remain to be published.

Joint Operations publications represent the lion's share of the library. Thirty-four are doctrine publications and thirty-two present operations TTPs. Eleven of the Joint Operations publications are currently proposed or under development. Ten of the

Operations publications are focussed on Operations Other Than War, with two of these documents in development: Humanitarian Assistance and Domestic Support Operations.⁵

The vast majority (84 of 108) of Publications in the Joint library were published less than three years ago. This rapid growth represents only the tip of the iceberg as service staffs and doctrine centers are now in overdrive to revise or develop service supporting doctrine to meet joint requirements. This effort has been complicated by: shrinking staffs, increased deployment operations tempo, the incorporation of new technology and the sheer volume of the effort. The Army's capstone manual, FM 100-5, is currently in the late stages of the revision process and will undoubtedly require a flurry of service revisions in supporting doctrine. The biggest current challenge for both joint and supporting service doctrine developers is to capture all the important lessons from recent contingency operations. Any publication published before 1996 is probably already in need of revision to meet the mandates of new Joint doctrine or changes that have taken place in the way we fight.

My review of doctrine has found it in a rapid period of change as both joint developers and the services struggle to quantify and incorporate lessons, technology, and our changed operational continuum. The most far reaching advancement in the doctrine process, and probably the developers salvation, is the automation of the library and its publication on CD-ROM. This one change has greatly facilitated access and the revision process. It has also simplified the search efforts for its users and expanded the audience to anyone with a computer and modem (including future enemies). Developers are also counting on this change to shorten the development and revision process. The remainder of this chapter will now focus on logistics in this decade.

EXECUTION

The Goldwater-Nichols mandated transition to jointness, force downsizing, budget constriction, and our transition from a global to a CONUS based military have all impacted the way our logistics forces support contingency operations. A new aggressive National Security Strategy of “Engagement and Enlargement” and its supporting Military Strategy have had the greatest impact.

The National Military Strategy of 1992: decentralized contingency planning and fostered the explosion in Joint Doctrine; announced the new “Base Force” and reductions of nearly one-third of our force structure; changed from a global to a regional approach; directed a new adaptive planning model for contingency planning; and began our military transition from a forward deployed to a power projection force. All of this change was meant to be a gradual process, taken sequentially over time, but time was a luxury in this new age of uncertainty that history will prove we did not have.

A historical repetitive challenge for our military forces has been the effective execution of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). This century and this decade there are numerous examples ranging from Vietnam to Bosnia. In 1986 the Joint Low-Intensity Conflict project in its final report concluded: “As a nation, we do not understand low-intensity conflict; we respond without unity of effort; we execute our activities poorly; and we lack the ability to sustain operations.”⁶ Current military literature continues to question the validity of our Joint and Service doctrine in meeting the demands of MOOTW.⁷ One of the major historical challenges our doctrine faces is that each of these operations is unique. Current doctrine is trying to quantify these

differences and make allowances for the different types of force structure and actions required by each.

Military Operations Other Than War place different demands on military forces than conventional force on force conflicts. For the logistician the differences are dramatic at both the tactical and operational level. A vast number of the new doctrinal concepts being incorporated into current doctrine are rooted in innovative techniques utilized by our Armed Forces during operations this decade. Any discussion of these concepts needs to begin with Desert Shield/Desert Storm, where a majority of today's doctrine techniques were lessons learned.

DESERT SHIELD

On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait and seized control of the Emirate within 24 hours.⁸ In response to this aggression, the U.S. military began deploying equipment, supplies, and forces to destinations in Saudi Arabia.⁹ The massive size of deploying coalition forces, lack of prepositioned equipment, and sheer length of our air line of communication demanded enormous amounts of strategic lift in a short period of time. On 7 August, the Operation known as Desert Shield began with a principal objective of deterring "further aggression and to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait."¹⁰

After the President elected a military response to Iraq's invasion "U.S. Air carriers voluntarily began supporting the vast airlift requirements of Operation Desert Shield through an AMC (Air Mobility Command) expansion buy. They moved their first passengers on 7 August 1990."¹¹ During this expansion, the carriers augmented USAF strategic lift with over 100 missions. On 18 August Air Mobility Command activated 38 aircraft from 16 carriers in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program. Over the next

four months these aircraft flew nearly 2,000 missions. On 16 January 1991, the Secretary of Defense activated CRAF stage II, a first in the history of the program. By 12 February these aircraft were flying nearly 24 missions a day and in total flew over 4,700 missions.¹² Although this CRAF activation represents a historical first for U.S. forces, and an excellent capability demonstration, it accounted for less than fifteen percent of the total airlift requirement. During the first 30 days of the deployment the theater received 38,000 troops and 163,581 tons of equipment by air including 12,435 tracked combat vehicles and 117,157 wheeled vehicles. This total is “roughly equivalent to the number of trucks and buses registered in the state of Alaska.”¹³

In addition to the air flow, the Navy’s Military Sealift Command delivered a total of 459 shiploads of cargo to the Kuwaiti theater between August 1990 and March 1991.¹⁴ Both the sheer volume of the deployment and a conscious decision to give first movement priority to combat units severely complicated the Reception, Staging and Onward Integration (RSOI) of troops and supplies during Operation Desert Shield. This decision also forced a heavy early reliance on host nation support and contracting for support.¹⁵ During Desert Shield/Storm more than 70,000 contracts were executed to augment organic logistics capabilities.¹⁶

A severe shortage in surface transportation complicated the Army component’s execution of its (Title 10 United States Code) responsibility for surface land transport support in theater. This shortage, which included heavy equipment transport, tractor trailers and material handling equipment, forced both the Air Force and Marines to establish their own systems which further complicated the management of transportation assets in theater.¹⁷ Everyone established work-arounds during the early days of the

deployment and many of these Ad Hoc arrangements would remain to complicate efforts throughout the deployment.

The late arrival of the Logistics forces also caused a loss in asset visibility at the ports. Incomplete manifests, mislabeled pallets, shortages of material handling equipment and lack of transport caused a huge bottleneck and backlog of supplies at the port. As the pile grew larger and inventory control was lost because shippers elected to fill containers irrespective of final destination, the “Iron Mountains” grew higher. Army port operations have also been faulted with lacking a material tracking system and sloppy documentation procedures that compounded the problem.¹⁸

System bottlenecks forced customers to reorder or work around the system. In many cases the equipment had arrived but could not be located. Going outside the system caused a saturation of the airlift system with high-priority demands. In December 1990, there was 7,000 tons of cargo on the ground at Dover awaiting shipment to Saudi Arabia, constituting six times the total daily airlift capacity.¹⁹

Problems with the operation and synchronization of service logistics automation equipment were also evident. This deployment caught the Army in the middle of a system conversion to its automated supply requisition system. The current system also relies heavily on the commercial telephone infrastructure for data transfer. Units with incompatible software, the lack of phone lines and supply bottlenecks rapidly caused the loss of confidence in the system. At one point there were 26 separate logistic databases in theater.²⁰

The use of reservists, mobilization, CRAF augmentation, logbase concept, and performance of soldiers and equipment were all good news stories. Desert Shield/Desert

Storm stand as examples of the old “American Way of War.” The war represents a legacy of the cold war and a demonstration of the strategic flexibility gained with both a robust force structure and the luxury of having time to build combat power. After Desert Storm, the Navy recovered 903,000 short tons of equipment and supplies in 236 ships by December 1991.²¹ At best, it is questionable if we retain this capability today. After downsizing, and the further migration of Combat Service Support to the reserves, with equipment that is 6 years older, our military forces would be hard pressed to support a full scale return of forces to the theater.

OPERATION RESTORE HOPE (SOMALIA)

In April 1992, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 751 that established the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) with the mission of providing humanitarian aid and facilitating the end of hostilities in Somalia.²² Over the next six months a UN Operation, including a U.S. contingent, delivered and distributed supplies in an attempt to end starvation and devastation. After the situation deteriorated, the UN accepted an offer by the United States to lead a multinational coalition to provide security for relief operations and humanitarian relief. Between 9 December 1992 and 4 May 1993 this operation involved more than 38,000 troops from 21 nations.²³ In May 1993, the UN resumed control and US participation decreased to logistical support and a quick reaction combat force.²⁴

In December 1992, CENTCOM ordered the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force to serve as the nucleus of the combined task force. Concurrently, the 10th Mountain Division was alerted for deployment. The deployment of forces to Somalia encountered many of the same problems that occurred during Desert Shield.²⁵ These problems were aggravated by

the exclusion of tactical units during development of the deployment plan and failure to realize the scope of logistics requirements for an “undeveloped theater.”²⁶ Additionally, the decision to defer logistics personnel in favor of combat forces complicated Reception, Staging and Onward Integration (RSOI) of arriving forces. The total lack of infrastructure for terminal operations and condition of the ports also complicated efforts.

The 10th Mountain Division deployed to Somalia prepared to provide logistical support to its own units. Upon arrival, it was confronted with constrained port operations and the need to offload prepositioned ships. The rapidly arriving Army units quickly overwhelmed the support capability of the Marine Corps Force Service Support Group and forced the consolidation of arriving army logistics units to perform wholesale logistics functions for the entire theater.²⁷

The lack of links between automated logistics systems also caused significant problems that mirrored those of Desert Storm. Loss of intransit visibility was as prevalent as it had been in Saudi Arabia. “The inability of the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and military standard transportation and movement procedures to exchange data electronically aggravated the loss in visibility.”²⁸ Again, soldiers found themselves making physical checks of containers and searching the mountain of critical inbound supplies for customer requests. Units were forced to resort to six separate supply processes to obtain resupply. A major lesson was that without a “centralized theater logistics management system, we not only lose visibility of materiel in the pipeline and in storage at either end of it, but lack the ability to ‘cross-level’ supplies in theater.”²⁹

One major innovation in Somalia was the first use of the Army's Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP). At the request of the Marines, contractor personnel were on the ground in Somalia one day after the USMC landing.³⁰ After the withdrawal of US forces in December 1993, LOGCAP remained as the sole provider of logistical support to UNOSOM until March 1994. In total, this program cost \$ 63 million to support U.S. Forces and \$41 million for UN support until March 1994. This important contractor augmentation package provided: base camp construction, maintenance, food service and supply, laundry service, field sanitation, power production, water production, bulk petroleum handling and transportation support. Downsizing and the migration of Combat Service Support functions from the active forces to the reserves make this contractor augmentation a critical player in future contingency and MOOTW operations.

OPERATION SUPPORT HOPE (RWANDA)

On 4 July 1994, the capital of Rwanda fell to Tutsi domination. Thousands of refugees fearing genocide began to flee Zaire. The influx of refugees quickly overwhelmed humanitarian assistance efforts. By 24 July, U.S. military personnel had deployed to Zaire and Uganda to begin humanitarian assistance operations. The initial U.S. logistics effort was completed under UN control and limited to providing clean water and food distribution.³¹

The U.S. European Command was ordered into the area after a crisis arose. They deployed a survey team and used the team's input to develop the flow of follow-on forces. However, a continued lack of discipline in using the planning tools led to continued failure in deployment of forces into theater. The JTF commander on the ground found it very difficult to influence the deployment, as personnel in Zaire were

identifying requirements.³² The JTF commander lacked the ability to enter the JOPES system and build his force. As had been the case in Desert Storm and Restore Hope, several commands and agencies were providing input to the TPFDD and as the forward Headquarters was trying to adjust this flow, the rear elements were pushing units based on the requirements reflected in the data base.

Operation Support Hope also experienced asset visibility problems similar to previous operations. Higher-priority units displaced both the Material Management Center and the Arrival/Departure Airfield Control Group (ADAG).³³ Intransit visibility procedures were not followed because of the loss of the ADAG, which did not arrive until three weeks after the operation began.³⁴ Additional visibility problems arose because departure airfields did not use standard procedures for manifesting and documenting cargo. Cumulatively, these problems forced the JTF commander to use untrained personnel at local airports to meet aircraft, break out cargo and route it to its final destination.³⁵

Like Operations Desert Storm and Support Hope, the automated logistics systems suffered from a lack of communications infrastructure and introduction of a new tactical requisition system. This new system was fielded ahead of schedule in an effort to avoid problems but the end result was the inability to transmit supply and material requisitions for several days.³⁶

LOGCAP support was also provided in RWANDA. Brown and Root contractors drilled wells and both stored and distributed potable water. This operation significantly offset long term military support commitments and conserved military capability. The support ran from July to September 1994 at a cost to the Army of over 6 million dollars.

OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (HAITI)

On 19 September 1994, Joint Task Force 180, under the command of Lieutenant General H. Hugh Shelton, departed Pope Air Force Base bound for a forced entry into Haiti. This departure precipitated a last-minute capitulation by the Cedras government.³⁷ Both Combat Support and Combat Service Support units had been tailored to support the anticipated forced entry requirements which vary dramatically from peace keeping requirements. Although this last minute accord avoided violence, it significantly complicated the logistics effort because critical support and resources had been committed to implement the forced entry plan. These resources could not be diverted fast enough to meet the demands of Joint Task Force 190 and its Peace keeping mission instead of Joint Task Force 180's combat mission.

The original plan called for JTF 190, built around the 10th Mountain Division, to follow TF 180 and execute a mission hand off. Planning had not considered the possibility of an abortion for TF 180 within hours of forced entry. Port and airfield organization plus required bases suffered "severe dislocation."³⁸

US Atlantic Command (USACOM) spent more than a year planning for operations in Haiti and the LOGCAP was included from the start.³⁹ The contractor was mobilized in September 1994 to support both US and multinational forces. In addition to support that had been demonstrated in Somalia, the contractor provided base camp construction, road maintenance and was prepared to provide medical services, guard services and airfield repair. Within 60 days there were more than 500 Brown and Root personnel in Haiti supporting 15,000 soldiers.⁴⁰

During Operation Uphold Democracy the Department of Defense tested two new doctrinal concepts. First, was the formation of a single logistics command for all

activities from the Army Material Command and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). The second innovation was to employ soldiers and civilians from Table of Distribution and Allowance (TDA) units to release operational soldiers for redeployment.

DLA used military operations in Haiti to test its new Contingency Support Team Concept. This initiative was rooted in lessons of both Operation Desert Shield/Storm and Restore Hope. DLA deployed a 20-man team to Haiti that worked closely with all customers “to ensure that goods and services were promptly and properly received.”⁴¹ They also established a Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office (DRMO) at Port-au-Prince in October.

The first Joint Logistics Support Command (JLSC) was also formed to handle the DLA and AMC missions and eventually assumed responsibility for all other logistics operations in theater.⁴² When tensions began to mount back in Southwest Asia and the COSCOM was withdrawn from Haiti, the JLSC took control of tactical units in the contingency. This represents a significant first with a Table of Distribution and Allowance (TDA) headquarters commanding tactical units. This headquarters had been employed to exercise command and control over TDA elements from DLA and AMC. With the departure of the COSCOM, it was given responsibility for all theater logistics, and command of tactical combat service support units in theater. It answered to the JTF commander in this capacity and the JLSC became a subordinate command of the multinational force commanded by the Commanding General of the 10th Mountain Division.

Overall, while not without its support problems, Haiti appears to have provided valuable insights into how we should plan and organize support for future operations.

The LOGCAP support and Defense agency support on site both appear to have been winners.

OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR (BOSNIA)

The implementation of the Dayton agreement of December 1995 was assigned to NATO. The United States committed the 1st Armored Division to the Operation. When the peace agreement called for the immediate entry of a large combat force into Bosnia, deployment plans were tailored accordingly. As with all previous contingencies discussed in this research, these changes deferred and delayed “essential logistics support personnel to the theater of operations.”⁴³

Headquarters, European Command used the LOGCAP to contract with civilian firms and build forward logistics bases as forces arrived. Priority conflicts between LOGCAP requirements for military airlift and the movement of combat forces were resolved in favor of combat forces. The usual problems between JOPES and other systems with data transfer were also repeated. A new computer movement planning and status system was not used.⁴⁴

Joint Endeavor has avoided (to date) the asset visibility and major supply disruptions of previous contingencies. An automated manifest system is in use to support supply operations. Additionally, lessons in more efficient contracting and forward support teams from DLA and AMC are present. Unlike previous contingencies, the rail system is playing the most vital role in Bosnia. During the deployment phase over 480 commercial trains were used to move over 700 vehicles and 250,000 short tons of supplies.⁴⁵ In addition to military transportation, more than 1,000 civilian contracted buses transported nearly 20,000 American soldiers from Germany to Bosnia.⁴⁶

LOGCAP is also alive and well in Bosnia. Brown and Root has almost 1,000 U.S. employees and 5,500 local national under contract to provide support to the military. In 1996, the LOGCAP built 35 base camps and provided food services, sanitation, laundry and mail services in these camps.⁴⁷ Both the LOGCAP program and theater logistics command element continue to prove their worth in contingency operations.

INNOVATION

The decade of the 1990's has been a period of historic and unprecedented change in military logistics. The scope of logistics changes is being characterized as revolutionary. There are four drivers of this revolution in military logistics:

- A CONUS based power projection military has replaced our forward presence force.
- Force reductions and restructuring efficiencies have reduced the supporter to customer ratio.
- Reduced resourcing has forced logisticians to find ways to do more with less in support of a vastly increased OPTEMPO.
- Changed operational demands, from conventional force on force to MOOTW operations have changed the requirements for logistical support.

Collectively, these drivers have forced logisticians to find efficiencies and develop innovative methods that will accomplish more with less manpower, smaller stocks of supplies, and reduced budgets.

The conversion from the “forward presence” military of the 80's, to a “force projection” military based primarily in CONUS, has driven a need for improved mobility.

Three mobility enhancement programs have been developed and implemented to meet the expanded response demands of this decade.

The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program was activated during Desert Shield. For the first time in the program's history, CRAF stage II was invoked on 16 January 1991. The program flew over 4,700 missions and has been judged a rousing success at augmenting our nation's strategic airlift capability.⁴⁸

The second mobility enhancement program tested and reworked to meet the new strategic mobility demands was our nation's prepositioning program. The United States uses two prepositioning programs to reduce both the response time and strategic airlift sorties needed to respond to a crisis. The changes incorporated into these programs were driven by the 1992 Mobility Requirements Study (MRS) and validated by the 1995 Bottom-UP Review Update (BURU). The land-based prepositioning program maintains unit sets of equipment in Europe (3 sets), Southwest Asia (2 sets + division headquarters), and the Pacific (1 set). A seventh land based Brigade set of equipment is currently being coordinated for distribution from Army stocks in Europe to Southwest Asia.

In Europe, the Army will stockpile three heavy brigade sets, a reduction of six sets from cold war storage levels. These sets are located in the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Italy. Two of the retrograded sets from Europe are being redistributed to Southwest Asia, a third set is designated to constitute a second Army brigade afloat set. The Air Force maintains 12 air base support sets of equipment and the Marine Corps stores supplies and equipment for a Brigade sized MAGTAF in Norway.

In Southwest Asia, the Army will maintain two heavy brigade sets. The first set is positioned in Kuwait and the second set plus a division headquarters is to be in Qatar by the end of FY 2000. The Air Force will maintain 46 air base operations sets in the region. A final Army land based set is on station in South Korea.

The sea-based program consists of 34 ships of which 23 are chartered from the commercial fleet, 10 are on loan from the Navy's Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF) and one is a government tanker. The Army currently maintains equipment for one heavy brigade afloat. The United States Marine Corps maintains three Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons (MPSRONS), consisting of a total of thirteen ships, capable of delivering equipment and supplies to support a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) consisting of one division, one wing and one force service support group. These vessels are organized into three squadrons with each squadron capable of supporting 17,300 personnel for thirty days. The squadrons are stationed in the Western Pacific, Indian Ocean and Mediterranean Sea.

The Army maintains six chartered vessels and eight RRF ships carrying equipment for one Army brigade and its associated support. These ships are stationed in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Three chartered ships carry Air Force munitions, with one stationed in the Mediterranean and the remaining two in the Indian Ocean. The Navy charters one ship to carry a fleet (ashore) hospital. The remaining three ships in the program are equipped to transfer fuel directly to forces ashore.⁴⁹

With all the work that has been accomplished in the sea-based program, there remains a severe shortage of ships in the program. The Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF) is currently short five vessels to meet the requirements of the MRS for strategic sealift. The

Marine Corps program is short three vessels. The Army afloat program requires three additional ships and must replace the 8 on loan from the Navy's RRF.⁵⁰ All of the above program enhancements are programmed to be completed by FY 2001 but remain budget dependent and will be forced to compete with other modernization requirements.

The third program modified to enhance mobility is our nation's War Reserve Program. In 1988 the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) assumed management of the CONUS stockpile of strategic materials from the Government Services Administration.⁵¹

In 1992, the Army began the process of reorganizing its war reserves and operational project stocks. Stockpiles were delinked from specific warfighting commands, quantities were reduced from cold war levels, and stocks were positioned in CONUS, Europe, prepositioned afloat, Korea and Southwest Asia. War Reserve Secondary Items, which include: rations, clothing, tentage, packaged petroleum, barrier materials, medical supplies and repair parts serve as starter stocks to bridge the gap until follow-up supplies become available. These stocks are not adequate today and there is no funding projected to alleviate this shortage. Current estimates identify a \$ 2.4 billion shortfall in these critical stores.⁵²

Force downsizing, reduced stockpiles and reduced resourcing have changed the way our logistics forces supply the force. The American way of war with its "Iron Mountains" and supply based system has begun its evolution to a distribution based system and "Just-In-Time" supply. The Army Chief of Staff described this new system when he noted:

Universal agreement exists that a revolution in logistics and maintenance must accompany any revolution in warfighting. Global 'Total Asset Visibility,' along with 'Just-When-Needed' distributed logistics, will

provide the major advancements in Combat Support and Combat Service Support required by the forces of the future.⁵³

From FY 89 to FY 95 the DOD reduced its secondary inventory by 35 percent, from 107 billion to 69.6 billion in constant FY 95 dollars. Programmed future reductions will further reduce these depot stocks to 55 billion by FY 2001.⁵⁴ In addition to reduced backup supplies, the Army has reduced by more than 50 percent the customer stores of repair parts to improve mobility. This reduction in backup stocks dictates a faster procurement system and a streamlined method of supplying forward-deployed forces.

The two major components of the new distribution based logistics system are the “Total Asset Visibility” initiative and the “Velocity Management” initiative. Both of these initiatives are enhancements that will by design, collectively offset reduced stockage levels by facilitating faster systemic response with improved visibility over what is stocked, and faster delivery to the customer with improved distribution oversight.

Total Asset Visibility has been identified by the Secretary of Defense as “a key ingredient of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff focused logistics concept for the future.”⁵⁵ It is defined as:

The ability to gather information from DOD systems on the identification, quantity, condition, location, movement, and status of material, units, personnel, equipment, and supplies anywhere in the logistics system at anytime, and to apply that information to improve logistics processes.⁵⁶

This initiative is highly dependent on systems automation and the ability of service transportation and supply automation management models to communicate. The supply portion of the initiative is heavily dependent on accelerated procurement and timely manufacturing response. The transportation part of the initiative relies heavily on extensive contractor support (FEDEX, UPS, USPS, etc.). While the technology to support this initiative exists and is being fielded, the one system of systems to link and

provide the “total Asset Visibility” envisioned by the Secretary remains outside the realm of current capability.

Any lack of in-theater contractor transportation support, automated systems integration or even phone lines will place the current “Just-In-Time” logistics support concept in jeopardy. A major flaw in this development design is its reliance on near “peacetime” conditions with a developed infrastructure and good communications capability. In his *1997 Annual Report to the President and Congress*, Secretary Cohen remarked: “with the reduction in force structure and peacetime logistics workload, the Department has implemented policies, procedures, and methods which minimize the structural overhead of logistics.”⁵⁷

The force downsizing and elimination of redundant levels of support and supply appear to have shaped our forces for small contingency operations and reduced resourcing. At the same time however, it appears that this redesign has been at the expense of our capability to fight a major regional contingency. Reduced stocks, elimination of redundancy, heavy reliance on contractor support, and force downsizing have accommodated forced budget reductions but simultaneously equate to reduced flexibility and capability.

That is not to say that all of the innovation and redesign have been counterproductive. Indeed, many of the innovative concepts developed to support contingency operations have proven themselves as exceptional capability enhancements. The increased reliance on the RC forces to augment AC capability is probably the single change that has proven to make the difference over and over again. It also holds the most promise for future operations. During Desert Storm the laudable performance of 81,000

reservists to meet logistics demands was a key to success. This success fostered their continued integration in every major contingency since.

Improved contracting techniques constitute a second major enhancement to our logistical capability. From Desert Storm, where 70,000 contracts were utilized, to Bosnia where eighteen months into the operation the U.S. Army had obligated well over a billion dollars, the innovations in contracting have been a good news story. Collateral benefits of this influx of cash into the civilian economy have been noted as providing the local commander with an additional tool and a significant boost to peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts for devastated or ailing economies. In Bosnia, the LOGCAP and other DOD contracting programs had interjected over six hundred million dollars directly into the Bosnian economy by the eighteen-month mark. These payments were in the form of weekly paychecks to the local population employed by DOD and its 26 major civilian contractors and in spite of the lack of a central banking structure in Bosnia. This infusion of capital, paid to the local nationals and not the government, is being credited with beginning the economic recovery of the war torn nation.⁵⁸

The Logistics Civil Augmentation Program is a third innovation born out of necessity and the “availability of military logistic assets to (support) JTF Commander’s missions.”⁵⁹ Its use in Rwanda, Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, and during Operation Vigilant Warrior (Saudi & Kuwait) has been touted as a “proven force multiplier” and a critical requirement to the effective execution of MOOTW operations.⁶⁰

The deployment of Forward Contingency Support Teams from the Defense Logistics Agency was a fourth proven winner. First used during Operation Uphold Democracy (Haiti), this forward deployment of DLA contingents and representatives from additional

defense agencies to work issues for the JTF commander needs to be institutionalized. Additionally, the formation of a formal Joint Logistics Support Command for theater operations needs address in joint doctrine. Every contingency this decade either formed one or tasked a lead service to serve as the single point of contact for all logistics in theater.

There have been numerous innovations and new techniques developed and implemented to meet the demands of contingency operations this decade. All were made to replace absent force structure or to overcome logistics shortfalls in support of deployed forces. Many operate effectively in the Low-Intensity threat environment. Whether they will work in the Medium-Threat or High-Threat environment remains in question. An institutionalized reliance on “peacetime” techniques to offset what was provided by force redundancy in the past entails considerable risk.

¹ James R. Locher, *Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols*, Joint Force Quarterly, No. 13, Autumn 1996, p. 17.

²Joint Doctrine Story, available on the internet at: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/docinfo/doctrine_story.html.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid., figure 1.

⁵ See Military Doctrine Story, available on line at: <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine>.

⁶ Joint Low Intensity Conflict Project (JLICP) Executive Summary, Joint Low Intensity Conflict Project Final Report, (Fort Monroe, Va.: US Army TRADOC, 1 Aug 86), 2.

⁷ John B. Hunt, *OOTW: A Concept in Flux*, Military Review, Sep-Oct 1996, pp. 3-9.

⁸ William G. Pagonis, *Moving Mountains, Lessons in Leadership and Logistics form the Gulf War* (Harvard Business School Press, Boston, Ma., 1992), 5.

⁹ US Senate, Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, Committee on Governmental Affairs, *Desert Storm Transportation and Distribution of Equipment, and Supplies in Southwest Asia*, report prepared by the General Accounting Office, 1991, p.1.

¹⁰ Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, 1 February 1995, pg. III-6.

¹¹ Joint Publication 4-05, *Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning*, 22 June 1995, pg. IV-15.

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- ¹² Ibid., pg IV-15.
- ¹³ Pagonis, 6.
- ¹⁴ Naval Doctrine Publication 4, *Naval Logistics* (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations; Washington D.C., 10 January 1995), 72.
- ¹⁵ Yves J. Fontaine, *Strategic Logistics for Intervention Forces*, Parameters, 27 (Winter 1997-98), 45.
- ¹⁶ Pagonis, 9.
- ¹⁷ GAO report, 4.
- ¹⁸ Parameters, 46.
- ¹⁹ Ibid., 47.
- ²⁰ Greg R. Gustafson, *Logistics Management Systems in Desert Shield/Desert Storm: How Did they Do?*(Carlisle Barracks, PA.: USAWC, 1992), 12.
- ²¹ Naval Doctrine Publication 4, 72.
- ²² Kenneth C. Allard, *Somalia Operation: Lessons Learned* (Washington D.C.: National Defense University, 1995), 14.
- ²³ Ibid., 16
- ²⁴ Ibid., 18
- ²⁵ Parameters, 48.
- ²⁶ S.L. Arnold and David T. Stahl, *A Power Projection Army in Operations Other Than War*, Parameters, 23 (winter 1993-1994), 11.
- ²⁷ Jeanette K. Edmunds, *Organizing Logistics for Peace and War, the Necessity of a Trained Joint Logistics Support Command Headquarters*, National Defense University, Essays on Strategy XIII (Washington D. C.: National Defense University, 1996), 235.
- ²⁸ Parameters, 49.
- ²⁹ Parameters, 50.
- ³⁰ Camille M. Nichols, *The Logistics Civil Augmentation Program*, Military Review, Mar-Apr 96, pp. 65-79.
- ³¹ Edmunds, pp. 139-140.
- ³² Parameters, 50.
- ³³ Ibid., 51.
- ³⁴ Ibid.
- ³⁵ Headquarters, U.S. European Command, *Operation Support Hope, 1994 After Action Review*, (Headquarters, US European Command, 1995), 2.
- ³⁶ Ibid., pg. 8-2.
- ³⁷ Robert F. Baumann, *Operation Uphold Democracy, Power Under Control*, Military Review, July-August 1997, pp. 14-15.
- ³⁸ Ibid., 15.
- ³⁹ Camille M. Nichols, *The Logistics Civil Augmentation Program*, Military Review, March-April 1996, 68.
- ⁴⁰ Mike Kelly, *Deploying a Contingency Support Team*, Army Logistician, Jan-Feb 1996, 12.
- ⁴¹ Julian A Sullivan, Jr., and Stephen D. Abney, *New Logistics Concepts Tested in Haiti*, Army Logistician, May-June 1995, pp. 7-9.
- ⁴² Ibid., 8.
- ⁴³ Parameters, 52.

⁴⁴ Department of the Army, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Operation Joint Endeavor Task Force Eagle Initial Operations* (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: May 1996), 13.

⁴⁵ Military Logistics and Today's Military Operations, available on the internet at: <http://lee-dnsi.army.mil/quatermaster/bulletin/mercenary.html>, 2.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 3.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Joint Staff, Joint Publication 4-05, *Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning*, (Washington D.C.: GPO, 22 Jun 1995), IV-15

⁴⁹ William S. Cohen, *Annual Report To Congress*, (Washington D.C.: GPO, April 1997), 169.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 23.

⁵¹ DLA History, available on line at: <http://www.dla.mil/history.htm>

⁵² AUSA, *Army Budget Fiscal Year 1997*, (Arlington, Va.: Institute of Land Warfare, May 1996), 56.

⁵³ Dennis J. Reimer, *Preparing Now To Meet 21st Century Challenges*, Army Green Book 1997-1998, (Arlington Va.: AUSA, October 1997), 28.

⁵⁴ Cohen, 134.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 135.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 134

⁵⁸ The Center For Army Lessons Learned, *Rebuilding the Economic Base during Operation Joint Endeavor (OJE) and Operation Joint Guard*, News From the Front, Sep-Oct 97, pp. 19-23

⁵⁹ Camille M. Nichols, *The Logistics Civil Augmentation Program*, Military Review, Mar-Apr 96, pp. 65-79

⁶⁰ U.S. Army Combined Arms Command, *Operation Restore Hope Lessons Learned Report* (Fort Leavenworth, Ks.: 1993), xi-19.

Chapter 5

CONCLUSIONS

Accordingly, if the army does not have baggage and heavy equipment it will be lost; if it does not have provisions it will be lost, if it does not have stores it will be lost.

—Sun Tzu

This research agrees with the National Defense Panel's conclusion that "there is insufficient connectivity between strategy on the one hand, and force structure, operational concepts, and procurement decisions on the other."¹ The effects of post cold war Departmental reorganization (downsizing), the Total Force Policy, budget constriction, and evolution from a forward presence to a power projection force are cumulatively discordant with the demands of our new, aggressive National Security Strategy. Drastic changes have taken place in our Armed Forces operational concepts (doctrine and methods) in an effort to fill the void between capability and requirements. Simultaneously, force structure and procurement programs, driven by legislative decisions and the nation's mandate for a "peace dividend"; have complicated departmental efforts to retain relevance, potency, capabilities and quality.

Military logisticians have been the hardest pressed element of our Armed Forces in the effort to meet the expanded demands of the aggressive National Security Strategy. With their reduced force structure and reduced capabilities they have led the field in their

evolution to a Joint approach. The innovation and incorporation of new methods to meet the demands of contingency operations and a power projection force are laudable. This evolution however, has not been without a price. The hiatus in modernization represents a mortgage of future capability.

The heavy reliance on a “low threat” operating environment, civilian contractors, and a developed transportation and communications system to support new methods (Total Asset Visibility, Velocity Management, USAF Lean Logistics) will prove disastrous in any medium or high threat environment. These systems will work efficiently in peacetime operations but the lack of redundancy and reliance on established infrastructure makes them vulnerable. Lose electricity or the phone system and the supply system will pause. Any break in the Just-In-Time design of these innovations and our commanders will just have to make do without. By design, backup stocks will not be in theater.

Military logistics is no longer designed to meet the demands of the worse case scenario. Instead, our logisticians have incorporated new techniques and methods that facilitate cost savings and speedy delivery in a peaceful theater. System redundancy in both force structure and stocks of supplies has been drastically reduced. The Air Force used to retain three levels of maintenance for its aircraft, now it has two. The Army has decimated its stocks or repair parts by nearly 50 percent, starting at unit level and reaching all the way back to the depot and National Inventory Control Point.

Severe shortages in War Reserve Secondary Items, Sealift, procurement dollars and support infrastructure collectively place our ability to respond to a Major Regional Contingency in jeopardy. Outsourcing and privatization work well in peacetime. Will

these programs work as well with competing demands, multinational corporations, combat operations or mobilization requirements posed in the next major crisis or next century?

At the beginning of this research project I posed four research questions:

- Does logistics doctrine adequately address the shift in emphasis toward MOOTW?
- Is change mandated to meet the differing demands of MOOTW?
- Do service logistic capabilities match the demands of our National Security and National Military Strategies?
- Are their recommended adjustments for service doctrine, capabilities or organization to meet the demands of the National Security Strategy?

Doctrine, in both the Joint area and supporting service doctrine, is in a rapid period of change. Since 1995, there have been 84 new Joint Publications. Service developers are in the process of publishing their supporting doctrine. The automation of doctrine libraries has significantly shortened the development cycle and fostered the “living document” approach. The mandates of Goldwater-Nichols and requirement that service doctrine support Joint doctrine will effectively eliminate disconnects that exist today.

Doctrinal change to meet the demands of MOOTW remains necessary. Two Joint Publications, JP 4-07 and JP 4-08, still remain to be published. Two of the ten Joint Publications dealing with Operations Other Than War remain in development. All service doctrine published before 1996 must be revised and updated to meet the demands of the new Joint doctrine.

Service logistic capability does not currently fully meet the demands of our National Security Strategy or National Military Strategy. In today's environment, with multiple MOOTW, service capabilities can meet requirements but only at the expense of readiness and with extensive reliance on host nation infrastructure, civilian contractors and in a secure operating environment. We **do have** the capability "to shape the international environment to prevent or deter threats; to respond across the full spectrum of potential crisis, and to prepare today to meet the challenges of tomorrow's uncertain future."² We **do not have** the capability directed in the 1997 National Military Strategy to:

...Conduct a wide range of concurrent engagement activities and smaller-scale contingencies, including peace operations; **and conduct decisive campaigns against adversaries in two distant overlapping major theater wars**, all in the face of Weapons of Mass Destruction and other asymmetric threats.³

Although the likelihood of a two near simultaneous Major Theater War scenario is remote, plain mathematics proves we retain the capability to fight only one major theater war. A two-war scenario would require full mobilization of all elements of our national power. Even one major theater war in addition to ongoing contingency operations will require massive reserve callups beyond the level of Desert Storm. A Major Theater War in an underdeveloped theater would prove a dismal situation. Shortages of strategic lift, shortages in War Reserves and Prepositioning Programs, elimination of redundant stores and support organizations, and heavy reliance on a logistics automation infrastructure that requires both commercial phone lines and electricity could spell disaster during the initial stages of any such operation.

The last research question was the hardest to answer and is the primary reason for the length of this document. To develop recommended adjustments, it was necessary to "walk the dog" from our nation's security strategy, down through jointness, downsizing,

budgets, doctrine, execution and innovations. This methodology produced a series of recommendations that are by no means all inclusive. Instead, I have limited these recommendations to arguments specifically supported and discussed at length in preceding chapters.

Actions recommended for National Security Council implementation include:

- A revision of the National Military Strategy to account for the reduced capability of our military forces. We no longer retain the capability to conduct two near simultaneous or overlapping major theater wars.
- A comprehensive review of force commitment criteria and subsequent development of a policy that strengthens diplomatic, political, economic and other assistance efforts to forestall premature force commitments.
- A total refinement of the Inter-agency process. This process is impacting contingency capabilities and the coordinated response of our government to maximize all the elements of our national power. The process is encumbered by interagency rivalries, budget constraints, a lack in unity of effort and system complexity. In a national crisis speed is of the essence. Speed and an effective coordinated response are two contributions beyond the capability of the current process.

Recommendations for Department of Defense action include:

- Strong support for implementation of the recommendations presented by the National Defense Panel. The protection of modernization funding, improved coordination between DOD and the Department of State, revision of force commitment criteria, revision of the interagency process, establishment of a national crisis center, expansion of the National Security Counsel and creation of a logistics command all represent critical needs. Although many of the recommendations are near revolutionary and beyond the scope of DOD implementation, they are warranted. Without DOD support, they have little chance for implementation.
- The Department must take a strong position to defend critical modernization and procurement programs. The decision to fully fund contingency and readiness at the expense of procurement and modernization was a sound decision in the early 1990s. Conventional wisdom and both the General Accounting Office and National Defense Panel are now questioning the wisdom of this decision. Departmental budgets continue to forestall the recapitalization of the force to fund today's unresourced and unforecast imperatives. This must stop.
- End downsizing. The services are all below initial BUR and Base Force levels. OPTEMPO, deployments and turbulence are beginning to have a measurable impact.

Doing more with less continues to be a motto for the force. Service members have served under this ax throughout this decade. Every year they are told we are near the end and every year another study is published that lowers force levels. Morale in all components is beginning to suffer.

- Complete projected mobility enhancements (C-17 buys, Ship buys, Prepositioned Program buys, War Reserves shortages). These critical program enhancements represent collectively major contributors to our inability to meet the mandates of the current National Security Strategy. If priorities must be set in force modernization, these programs need to be at the top.
- DOD must continue to pursue the removal of legislative barriers to the full integration of the Reserve Components. Timely force mobilization and removal of barriers to utilization are essential to the “total force” policy.

Actions recommended for Joint Chiefs of Staff action include:

- Continued heavy emphasis on “Jointness” and service supporting doctrine development. Additionally, the joint doctrine review process needs extension to review service doctrine for compliance with joint demands. The current process is encumbered by high operations tempo, the shear volume of requirements and service resistance.
- Strong support for implementation of the recommendations of the NDP (see DOD). Especially noteworthy is the recommendation for creation of a logistics command and formal Joint Theater Logistics command for contingency operations.
- The JCS needs to convey the position that the DOD is in danger of becoming hollow. Significant risks have been accepted with the post cold war constriction. We cannot today fully meet the demands of our current National Military Strategy. If the legislature objects to adequately funding this strategy, they must accept a new and more limited strategy.

Recommendations for Military Departmental action include:

- Services must complete a comprehensive review of supporting doctrine to facilitate compliance with joint doctrine. All doctrine published prior to 1996 must be revised and updated to fully comply with joint mandates.
- Shortages in War Reserve Secondary Items need procurement NOW. These shortages of rations, clothing, tentage, packaged petroleum, barrier material, medical supplies and repair parts represent the long pole in the readiness tent. Prepositioned equipment is of limited utility without packaged petroleum. This estimated 2.4 billion dollar shortfall is a readiness issue and represents an abrogation in service responsibilities to “equip” the force.

- All services need to embrace the “Total Force Policy” on the scale of “Jointness” as our increased reliance on the Reserve Components dictates. The RC component is no longer a strategic reserve. They represent a component we all need to accomplish our daily mission in support of the National Security Strategy. Their effective integration should be a mission essential task for all active forces.
- All services need to standardize force contracting techniques and logistics automation for interoperability. Contractors on the battlefield are obviously here to stay. Doctrine needs to address these innovations and the DLA interface.

Confronted with a vastly expanded array of mission requirements and greatly reduced force structure, each of the Military Services and Joint activities has struggled mightily to meet new global demands. Innovation has been the savior to date. New technology, techniques, and innovative problem solving have made the difference. Both the pace and scope of departmental changes have been commendable. Our forces remain relevant to meet today’s threat but in the process find themselves in a position where they have paid the price with future capability. Unless projected funding levels are met during the next several years, we will find ourselves with a hollow force in 2005.

¹ National Defense Panel, *Transforming Defense, National Security in the 21st Century*, available on line at: <http://www.dtic.mil/ndp>, Executive Summary, 2.

² William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, (Washington D.C.: GPO, May 1997), 6.

³ NMS 92, 21.

Appendix A

BASE FORCE COMPARISON

	Cold War FY 1990	Base Force Plan ^b	FY 1997	FY 1998
Army — active divisions	18	12	10	10
Reserve component brigades ^c	57	34	42	42
Marine Expeditionary Force ^d	3	3	3	3
Navy aircraft carriers (active/reserve)	15/1	12/1	11/1	11/1
Carrier air wings (active/reserve)	13/2	11/2	10/1	10/1
Battle force ships (active/reserve)	546	430	354	346
Fighter wing equivalents (active/reserve)	24/12	15/11	13/7	13/7

^a Dual entries in the table show data for active/reserve forces, except for carriers, which depicts deployable/training carriers.

^b Bush Administration's planned FY 1995 force levels, as reflected in the January 1993 Annual Defense Report.

^c An appropriate equivalent. Includes 15 enhanced readiness brigades. Backing up this force will be an Army National Guard strategic reserve of eight divisions (24 brigades), two separate brigade equivalents, and a scout group.

^d One reserve Marine division, wing, and force service support group supports the active structure in all cases.

Excerpted from Secretary of Defense Annual Report 1997

Appendix B

Downsizing

Department of Defense Personnel (End of Fiscal Year Strength in Thousands)				
	FY 1987	FY 1997	FY 1998	Percent Change FY 1987-1998
Active Military	2,174	1,452	1,431	-34
Army	781	495	495	-37
Navy	587	402	391	-33
Marine Corps	199	174	174	-13
Air Force	607	381	371	-39
Selected Reserves	1,151	902	892	-22
DoD Civilians (FTEs*)	1,133	799	772	-32
* Full-time equivalents				

Excerpted from Secretary of Defense Annual Report 1997

Appendix C

Personnel Downsizing

	FY 86	FY 87	FY 88	FY 89	FY 90	FY 91	FY 92	FY 93	FY 94	FY 95	FY 96	FY 97 ^f	FY 98 ^g
Active Component													
Army	781.0	780.8	771.8	769.7	750.6	725.4	611.3	572.4	541.3	508.6	491.1	495.0	495.0
Navy	581.1	586.8	592.6	592.7	582.9	571.3	541.9	510.0	468.7	434.6	416.7	402.0	390.8
Marine Corps	198.8	199.5	197.4	197.0	196.7	195.0	184.6	178.4	174.2	174.6	174.9	174.0	174.0
Air Force	608.2	607.0	576.4	570.9	539.3	510.9	470.3	444.4	426.3	400.4	389.0	381.1	371.6
Total	2169.1	2174.1	2138.2	2130.2	2069.4	2002.6	1808.1	1705.1	1610.5	1518.2	1471.7	1452.1	1431.4
Reserve Component Military (Selected Reserve)													
ARNG	446.2	451.9	455.2	457.0	437.0	441.3	426.5	409.9	369.9	374.9	370.0	366.8	366.5
Army Reserve	309.7	313.6	312.8	319.2	299.1	299.9	302.9	275.9	259.9	241.3	226.2	215.2	208.0
Naval Reserve	141.5	148.1	149.5	151.5	149.4	150.5	142.3	132.4	107.6	100.6	98.0	96.3	94.3
MC Reserve	41.6	42.3	43.6	43.6	44.5	44.0	42.3	41.7	40.7	40.9	42.1	42.0	42.0
ANG	112.6	114.6	115.2	116.1	117.0	117.6	119.1	117.2	113.6	109.8	110.5	109.2	107.4
Air Force Reserve	78.5	80.4	82.1	83.2	80.6	84.3	81.9	80.6	79.6	78.3	73.7	73.3	73.4
Total	1130.1	1150.9	1158.4	1170.6	1127.6^c	1137.6^d	1114.9	1057.7	998.3	945.8	920.4	902.7	891.6
Civilian^e													
Army	416.1	416.9	406.2	401.5	398.4	369.6	364.5	327.3	289.5	272.7	258.6	256.2	248.4
Navy	354.5	349.7	351.5	350.2	349.0	331.8	319.5	295.0	276.5	259.3	239.9	224.9	215.7
Air Force	266.2	264.7	256.2	258.6	255.4	235.0	215.0	208.2	196.6	188.9	182.6	181.2	176.2
DoD Agencies	93.9	95.8	97.6	97.1	99.6	112.4	139.4	153.6	154.0	144.3	137.6	137.2	131.6
Total	1130.8	1127.1	1111.4	1107.4	1102.4	1048.7	1038.4	984.1	916.5	865.2	818.7	799.5	771.9

^a As of September 30, 1996.

^b Numbers may not add to totals due to rounding.

^c Does not include 25,600 members of the Selected Reserve who were activated for Operation Desert Shield, displayed in the FY 1990 active strength total and paid for from the Active Military Personnel Appropriations account.

^d Does not include 17,059 members of the Selected Reserve who were activated for Operation Desert Shield/Storm, displayed in the FY 1991 active strength total and paid for from the Active Military Personnel Appropriations account.

^e Includes direct and indirect hire civilian full-time equivalents.

^f FY 1997 National Defense Authorization Act.

^g Projected in FY 1998 President's Budget.

Excerpted from Secretary of Defense Annual Report 1997

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